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There are (at least) four ways that an agent can acquire information concerning the state of the universe:
via observation, control, prediction, and via retrodiction, i.e., memory. Each of these four ways of acquiring
information seems to rely on a different kind of physical device (resp., an observation device, a control device,
etc.). However it turns out that certain mathematical structure is common to those four types of device. Any
device that possesses a certain subset of that structure is known as an “inference device” (ID).
Here I review some of the properties of IDs, including their relation with Turing machines, and (more loosely)
quantum mechanics. I also review the bounds of the joint abilities of any set of IDs to know facts about
the physical universe that contains them. These bounds constrain the possible properties of any universe that
contains agents who can acquire information concerning that universe.
I then extend this previous work on IDs, by adding to the definition of IDs some of the other mathematical
structure that is common to the four ways of acquiring information about the universe but is not captured in
the (minimal) definition of IDs. I discuss these extensions of IDs in the context of epistemic logic (especially
possible worlds formalisms like Kripke structures and Aumann structures). In particular, I show that these
extensions of IDs are not subject to the problem of logical omniscience that plagues many previously studied
forms of epistemic logic.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Wheeler discussed “it from bit” [37], there has
been great interest in what constraints on the properties of the
universe can be derived using some appropriate mathematical
formulation of information. Some of this work relies on Shan-
non information theory [12, 19–21], and some of it on Fisher
information theory [17]. There has also been work on this
topic that focuses on the processing of information, i.e., that
views the universe through the lens of Turing machine (TM)
theory [13, 24, 26, 33, 43–47].
Here I adopt a different approach. I focus on the fact that
information concerning the state of the universe typically is
held by some agent embedded in that universe. For example,
we cannot speak of Shannon information without specifying
probability distributions — which reflect the uncertainty of
some specific agent concerning the state of the universe that
contains them (e.g., uncertainty of a scientist making a pre-
diction).
This leads us to analyze how an agent can acquire informa-
tion concerning the state of the world. That is the topic of this
paper, as described in the remainder of this introduction.
Inference devices
There are (at least) four ways an agent can acquire some
information concerning the universe in which it is embed-
ded: via an observation device, via a control device, via a
prediction device, and via a memory device, i.e., a “retrod-
iction” device. It turns out that there is some mathematical
structure shared by all such information-acquiring devices.
Devices with that structure are called “Inference Devices”
(IDs) [9, 38–40].
In the first section of this paper I present two examples of
how an agent can acquire information about the universe that
contains them, illustrating that in both examples the agent has
the mathematical structure of an ID. I then present some of the
more elementary impossibility results concerning IDs. These
results place strong constraints on what information about a
universe can be jointly held by different IDs embedded in that
universe. Importantly, these constraints arise only from the
definition of IDs, without any assumptions about the laws of
the universe containing the IDs; they hold in any universe that
allows agents that have information about that universe. In
particular, they would hold even in a classical, finite universe,
with no chaotic processes. They would also hold even in a
universe with agents who have super-Turing computation abil-
ities, can transmit information at super-luminal rates, etc. It is
worth noting as well that these impossibility theorems hold
even though there is no sense in which IDs have the ability of
self-reference.
After these preliminaries I present some of the connections
between the theory of IDs and the theory of Turing Machines.
In particular I analyze some of the properties of an ID version
of universal Turing machines and of an ID version of Kol-
mogorov complexity [13, 24, 26, 33, 43–47]. I show that the
ID versions of those quantities obey many of the familiar re-
sults of Turing machine theory (e.g., the invariance theorem
of TM theory).
I then consider one way to extend the theory of IDs to the
case where there is a probability distribution over the states
of the universe, so that no information is ever 100% guaran-
teed to be true. In particular, I present a result concerning the
products of probabilities of error of two separate IDs, a re-
sult which is formally similar to the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle.
These results all concern subsets of an entire universe, e.g.,
one or two IDs embedded in a larger universe. However we
can expand the scope to an entire universe. The idea is to de-
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2fine a “universe”, with whatever associated laws of physics, to
be a set of physical systems and IDs (e.g., a set of scientists),
where the IDs can have information concerning those physical
systems and / or one another. Adopting this approach, I use
the theory of IDs to derive impossibility results concerning the
nature of the entire universe.
Inference devices and epistemic logic
Most of the results presented to this point in the paper have
appeared before, albeit in a more complicated, less transpar-
ent formalism than the one used here [9, 38–40]. In the last
sections of the paper I present new results. These all involve
an extension of IDs, one that includes some of the features
that are shared by the four ways for an agent to acquire infor-
mation (observation, control, prediction and memory) but that
are not in the original definition of IDs.
I show that this strengthened version of IDs has a close rela-
tion to the various ways of formalizing “knowledge” that are
considered in epistemic logic [3, 16, 30, 42]. However the
ID-based theory of knowledge is not subject to what is per-
haps the major problem of these earlier ways of formalizing
knowledge, the problem of logical omniscience.
To explain that problem, it is easiest to work with the
event-based formulation of epistemic logic pioneered by Au-
mann [5–7, 10, 18]. In this formulation we start with a space
U of possible states of the entire universe across all time. (In
the literature this is typically called a set of “possible worlds”.)
An event is defined as a subset of U. For example, let U be a
set of all possible histories of the universe across all time and
space. Then the event {there are no clouds in the sky in Lon-
don during January 1, 2000} is all u ∈ U such that {there are
no clouds in the sky in London during January 1, 2000}. Be-
lief by an agent concerning the universe is formalized in terms
of a partition of U, which is called an Aumann structure and
an associated belief operator B : U → {Ri}. This is supposed
to represent the intuition that in any universe u, the agent be-
lieves that an event E ⊂ U holds iff B(u) ⊆ E. Knowledge is
then defined as true belief, i.e., a belief operator K with the
property that u ∈ K(u) for all u ∈ U [16]. Similarly, in the
event-based framework we say that “an agentknows event E
in world u ∈ U” if E holds for all worlds that the agent be-
lieves are possible when the actual world is u. So an agent
knows E at u if for their knowledge operator, K(u) ⊆ E.
Now suppose that some event E implies some event E′, i.e.,
E′ ⊇ E. This means that under the event-based definition of
knowledge, if agent i knows event E in world u, E′ is also true
in world u — and agent i knows event E′ in world u. General-
izing, the agent cannot know a set of facts without knowing all
logical implications of those facts. This is known as the prop-
erty of logical omniscience. As an example of this property,
suppose that someone multiplies two huge prime numbers and
then (honestly) tells that product to the agent — so that the
agent knows that product. Then since that product logically
implies its unique prime factorization, under the event-based
framework the agent must “know” the two prime numbers, in-
dependent of any considerations of whether they have a com-
puter to help them do calculations. This of course is absurd.
This problem of logical omniscience plagues possible-
worlds models of epistemic logic like those based on Au-
mann structures. Some extensions to possible-worlds mod-
els have been proposed to address this problem, e.g., bounds
on the computational powers of the agent [3], assuming that
the agent reasons illogically [16], and a set of related “im-
possible possible worlds” restrictions on the nature of the
agent [3, 16, 30, 42]. However none of these has proven
broadly convincing.
There are other difficulties with the event-based formaliza-
tion of knowledge. In that framework, by simply defining the
“knowledge operator” of a rock on the moon appropriately,
we would say that the rock “knows” whether it is in sunlight
or not (for example by having its knowledge operator pick
sets of states of the universe based on the temperature of that
rock). This pathology is due to the fact that the definition of
knowledge operators in the event-based framework does not
reflect the fact that knowledge is held by a sentient agent.
Specifically, any sentient agent that knows something about
the universe is able to correctly answer arbitrary questions
about what they know, either implicitly or explicitly. (Note
that a lunar rock cannot answer such questions.) However
there is nothing in the formal structure of Aumann structures,
Kripke structures, or the like that involves the ability of agents
to correctly answer questions.
The ID framework is concerned precisely with such ability
of an agent to answer questions about the information they
have. As a result, in the extension of the ID framework into
a full-fledged theory of knowledge, we cannot say that a rock
on the moon “knows” whether it is in sunlight. Moreover, the
ID-based theory of knowledge avoids the problem of logical
omniscience. Specifically, in the ID-based formalization of
knowledge, if an agent knows some fact A, and knows that A
implies B, then B is true — but the agent may not know that.
None of the results below are difficult to prove; some of
the proofs, especially those of the “Laplace demon theorems”,
are almost trivial. (The interest is the implications of the in-
ference device axioms for metaphysics and epistemology, not
the math needed to derive those implications.) Nonetheless,
the interested reader can find all proofs that are not given be-
low in [39].
INFERENCE DEVICES
In this section I review the elementary properties of infer-
ence devices, mathematical structures that are shared by the
processes of observation, prediction, recall and control [9, 38–
40]. These results are proven by extending Epimenides’ para-
dox to apply to novel scenarios. Results relying on more so-
phisticated mathematics, some of them new, are presented the
following section.
3Observation, prediction, recall and control of the physical world
I begin with two examples that motivate the formal defini-
tion of inference devices. The first is an example of an agent
making a correct observation about the current state of some
physical variable.
Example 1. Consider an agent who claims to be able to ob-
serve S (t2), the value of some physical variable at time t2. If
the agent’s claim is correct, then for any question of the form
“Does S (t2) = L?”, the agent is able to consider that ques-
tion at some t1 < t2, observe S (t2), and then at some t3 > t2
provide the answer “yes” if S (t2) = L, and the answer “no”
otherwise. In other words, she can correctly pose any such
binary question to herself at t1, and correctly say what the
answer is at t3.1
To formalize this, let U refer to a set of possible histories of
an entire universe across all time, where each u ∈ U has the
following properties:
i) u is consistent with the laws of physics,
ii) In u, the agent is alive and of sound mind throughout the
time interval [t1, t3], and the system S exists at the time t2,
iii) In u, at time t1 the agent considers some L-indexed ques-
tion q of the form “Does S (t2) = L?”,
iv) In u, the agent observes S (t2),
v) In u, at time t3 the agent uses that observation to provide
her (binary) answer to q, and believes that answer to be
correct.2
The agent’s claim is that for any question q of the form “Does
S (t2) = L?”, the laws of physics imply that for all u in the
subset of U where at t1 the agent considers q, it must be that
the agent provides the correct answer to q at t3. Any prior
knowledge concerning the history that the agent relies on to
make this claim is embodied in the set U.
The value S (t2) is a function of the actual history of the
entire universe, u ∈ U. Write that function as Γ(u), with image
Γ(U). Similarly, the question the agent has in her brain at t1,
together with the time t1 state of any observation apparatus
she will use, is a function of u. Write that function as X(u).
Finally, the binary answer the agent provides at t3 is a function
of the state of her brain at t3, and therefore it too is a function
1It may be that the agent has to use some appropriate observation apparatus
to do this; in that case we can just expand the definition of the “agent” to
include that apparatus. Similarly, it may be that the agent has to configure
that apparatus appropriately at t1. In this case, just expand our definition of
the agent’s “considering the appropriate question” to mean configuring the
apparatus appropriately, in addition to the cognitive event of her considering
that question.
2This means in particular that the agent does not lie, does not believe she was
distracted from the question during [t1, t3].
of u. Write that binary-valued function giving her answer as
Y(u).
Note that since U embodies the laws of physics, in partic-
ular it embodies all neurological processes in the agent (e.g.,
her asking and answering questions), all physical character-
istics of S , etc.
So as far as this observation is concerned, the agent is just
a pair of functions (X,Y), both with the domain U defined
above, where Y has the range {−1, 1}. A necessary condition
for us to say that the agent can “observe S (t2)” is that for any
γ ∈ Γ(U), there is some associated X value x such that for
all u ∈ U, so long as X(u) = x, it follows that Y(u) = 1 iff
Γ(u) = γ.
I now present an example of an agent making a correct pre-
diction about the future state of some physical variable.
Example 2. Now consider an agent who claims to be able
to predict S (t3), the value of some physical variable at time
t3. If the agent’s claim is correct, then for any question of the
form “Does S (t3) = L?”, the agent is able to consider that
question at some time t1 < t3, and produce an answer at some
time t2 ∈ (t1, t3), where the answer is “yes” if S (t3) = L and
“no” otherwise. So loosely speaking, if the agent’s claim is
correct, then for any L, by their considering the appropriate
question at t1, they can generate the correct answer to any
question of the form “Does S (t3) = L?” at t2 < t3.3
To formalize this, let U refer to a set of possible histories of
an entire universe across all time, where each u ∈ U has the
following properties:
i) u is consistent with the laws of physics,
ii) In u, the agent exists throughout the interval [t1, t2], and
the system S exists at t3,
iii) In u, at t1 the agent considers some question q of the form
“Does S (t3) = L?”,
iv) In u, at t2 the agent provides his (binary) answer to q and
believes that answer to be correct.4
The agent’s claim is that for any question q of the form “Does
S (t3) = L?”, the laws of physics imply that for all u in the
restricted set U such that at t1 the agent considers q, it must
be that the agent provides the correct answer to q at t2.
The value S (t3) is a function of the actual history of the
entire universe, u ∈ U. Write that function as Γ(u), with image
3 It may be that the agent has to use some appropriate prediction computer
to do this; in that case we can just expand the definition of the “agent” to
include that computer. Similarly, it may be that the agent has to program
that computer appropriately at t1. In this case, just expand our definition of
the agent’s “considering the appropriate question” to mean programming the
computer appropriately, in addition to the cognitive event of his considering
that question.
4This means in particular that the agent does not believe he was distracted from
the question during [t1, t2].
4Γ(U). Similarly, the question the agent considers at t1 is a
function of the state of his brain at t1, and therefore is also a
function of u. Write that function as X(u). Finally, the binary
answer the agent provides at t2 is a function of the state of his
brain at t2, and therefore it too is a function of of u. Write that
function as Y(u).
So as far as this prediction is concerned, the agent is just
a pair of functions (X,Y), both with the domain U defined
above, where Y has the range {−1, 1}. The agent can in-
deed predict S (t3) if for the space defined above U, for any
γ ∈ Γ(U), there is some associated X value x such that, no
matter what precise history u ∈ U we are in, due to the laws
of physics, if X(u) = x then the associated Y(u) equals 1 iff
Γ(u) = γ.
Evidently, agents who perform observation and those who
perform prediction are described in part by a shared mathe-
matical structure, involving functions X and Y defined over the
same space U of all possible histories of the universe across
all time. As formalized below, I refer to any such pair (X,Y)
as an “inference device”. Say that for some function Γ defined
over U, for any γ ∈ Γ(U), there is some associated X value x
such that, no matter what precise history u ∈ U we are in, due
to the laws of physics, if X(u) = x then the associated Y(u)
equals 1 iff Γ(u) = γ. Then I will say that the device (X,Y)
“infers” Γ.
See [39] for a more detailed elaboration of the examples
given above of observation and prediction in terms of infer-
ence devices. Arguably to fully formalize each of these phe-
nomena there should be additional structure beyond that defin-
ing inference devices. (See App. B. of [39].) Most such addi-
tional structure is left for future research. However, one par-
ticular part of such additional structure is investigated below,
in the discussion of “physical knowledge”.
In addition to considering observation and prediction, it is
also shown in [39] that a system that remembers the past is
an inference device that infers an appropriate function Γ(u).5
[39] also shows that a device that controls a physical variable
is an inference device that infers an appropriate function Γ(u).
All of this analysis holds even if what is observed / predicted /
remembered / controlled is not the answer to a question of the
form, “Does S (t) = L?”, but instead an answer to question of
the form, “is S (t) more property A than it is property B?” or
of the form, “is S (t) more property A than S ′(t) is?”
In the sequel I will sometimes consider situations involving
multiple inference devices, (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . ., with associ-
ated domains U1,U2, . . .. For example, I will consider scenar-
ios where agents try to observe one another. In such situations,
when referring to “U”, I implicitly mean ∩iUi, implicitly re-
strict the domain of all Xi,Yi to U, and implicitly assume that
the codomain of each such restricted Yi is binary.
5Loosely speaking, memory is just retrodiction, i.e., it is using current data
to predict the state of non-current data. However, rather than have the non-
current data concern the future, in memory it concerns the past.
Notation and terminology
To formalize the preceding considerations, I first fix some
notation. I will take the set of binary numbers B to equal
{−1, 1}. In the canonical case where U is the set of all possi-
ble histories of the entire universe across all space and time,
the value of any specific physical variable is specified by a
subset of the components of a full vector u ∈ U. (For ex-
ample, the variable of the speed of a particular particle in a
particular intertial frame at a particular time is given by a sub-
set of the components of u.) So any such variable is just a
function over U. Bearing this in mind, for any function Γ with
domain U, I will write the image of U under Γ as Γ(U), i.e.,
for the set of possible values of some physical variable. I will
also sometimes abuse this notation with a sort of “set-valued
function” shorthand, and so for example write Γ(V) = 1 for
some V ⊂ U iff Γ(u) = 1 ∀u ∈ V . On the other hand, for
the special case where the function over U is a measure, I use
conventional shorthand from measure theory. For example, if
P is a probability distribution over U and V ⊂ U, I write P(V)
as shorthand for
∑
u∈V P(u).
For any function Γ with domain U that I will consider, I
implicitly assume that the entire set Γ(U) contains at least two
distinct elements. For any (potentially infinite) set R, |R| is the
cardinality of R.
Given a function Γ with domain U, I write the partition of
U given by Γ−1 as Γ, i.e.,
Γ ≡ {{u : Γ(u) = γ} : γ ∈ Γ(U)} (1)
I say that two functions Γ1 and Γ2 with the same domain U
are (functionally) equivalent iff the inverse functions Γ−11 and
Γ−12 induce the same partitions of U, i.e., iff Γ1 = Γ2.
Recall that a partition A over a space U is a refinement of a
partition B over U iff every a ∈ A is a subset of some b ∈ B.
If A is a refinement of B, then for every b ∈ B there is an
a ∈ A that is a subset of b. Some of the elementary properties
of refinement will be used below, and so I now review them.
First, two partitions A and B are refinements of each other
iff A = B. Say a partition A is finite and a refinement of a
partition B. Then |A| = |B| iff A = B. For any two functions
A and B with domain U, I will say that “A refines B” if A is
a refinement of B. Similarly, for any R ⊂ U and function A,
I will say that “R refines A” (or “A is refined by R”) if R is a
subset of some element of A.
I write the characteristic function of any set R ⊆ U as the
binary-valued function
XR(u) = 1⇔ u ∈ R (2)
As shorthand I will sometimes treat functions as equivalent to
one of the values in their image. So for example expressions
like “Γ1 = Γ2 ⇒ Γ3 = 1” means ‘‘∀u ∈ U such that Γ1(u) =
Γ2(u), Γ3(u) = 1”.
To simplify terminology, rather than referring to Kronecker
delta functions (and / or Dirac delta functions) throughout, I
5will refer to a probe of a variable V , by which I mean any
function over U parametrized by a v ∈ V of the form
δv(v′) =
1 if v = v′−1 otherwise. (3)
∀v′ ∈ V . Given a function Γ with domain U I sometimes
write δγ(Γ) as shorthand for the function u ∈ U → δγ(Γ(u)).
When I don’t want to specify the subscript γ of a probe, I
sometimes generically write δ. I write P(Γ) to indicate the set
of all probes over Γ(U).
Weak inference
I now review some results that place severe restrictions on
what a physical agent can predict / observe / control / remem-
ber and be guaranteed to be correct (in that prediction / obser-
vation / control / memory). To begin, I formalize the concept
of an “inference device” introduced in the previous subsec-
tion.
Definition 1. An (inference) device over a set U is a pair of
functions (X,Y), both with domain U. Y is called the con-
clusion function of the device, and is surjective onto B. X is
called the setup function of the device.
Given some function Γ with domain U and some γ ∈ Γ(U),
we are interested in setting up a device so that it is assured of
correctly answering whether Γ(u) = γ for the actual universe
u. Motivated by the examples above, I will formalize this with
the condition that Y(u) = 1 iff Γ(u) = γ for all u that are
consistent with some associated setup value x of the device,
i.e., such that X(u) = x for some x. If this condition holds,
then setting up the device to have setup value x guarantees
that the device will make the correct conclusion concerning
whether Γ(u) = γ. (Hence the terms “setup function” and
“conclusion function” in Def. 1.)
We can formalize this as follows:
Definition 2. Let Γ be a function over U such that |Γ(U)| ≥ 2.
A device D (weakly) infers Γ iff ∀γ ∈ Γ(U), ∃x ∈ X(U) such
that ∀u ∈ U, X(u) = x⇒ Y(u) = δγ(Γ(u)).
IfD infers Γ, I writeD > Γ. I say that a deviceD infers a set
of functions if it infers every function in that set.
The following semi-formal example illustrates a scenario in
which weak inference holds, and a related scenario in which
it doesn’t hold.
Example 3. A scenario in which weak inference holds is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. In this example, for simplicity determinism
is assumed. The full rectangle, including both colored rectan-
gles, indicates the set of all possible histories of the universe
across all time, U (i.e., the set of all “states of the world”, in
the language of epistemology). In this example the function Γ
is whether the sky will (not) be cloudy at noon (at Greenwich,
say). Since the ID is embedded in the universe, the precise
T = Cloudy sky at noon T = Clear sky at noon
Q: Sky clear 
at noon?A: Yes
A: No
Q: Sky cloudy
at noon?
Q: Sky clear 
at noon?
Q: Sky cloudy
at noon?
FIG. 1. An example of correct prediction as weak inference, where
for simplicity determinism is assumed. The set U of all possible his-
tories of the universe is the full rectangle, including both the yellow
and blue subsets, which correspond to the two possible states of the
sky at noon. Two of the possible questions of the ID are indicated:
one of them is asked by the ID in all universes within the union of
the two red ellipses, and the other question is asked in all universes
within the union of the two blue ellipses. The ID weakly infers Γ,
i.e., correctly predicts the state of the sky at noon, since whichever
of the two possible questions it considers, it is guaranteed that its
answer is correct.
question concerning the future state of the universe that it is
instructed to answer picks out different subsets of the set of all
possible histories of the universe across all time. There are
two such sets indicated, corresponding to the ID being asked
the question, “will the sky be cloudy at noon?” or being asked
the question, “will the sky be clear at noon?”. (Histories
falling outside of both of those sets correspond to questions
different from those two.) Again, since the ID is embedded in
the universe, and since its answer can have two possible val-
ues, which answer it gives (say at 11am) is a partition across
U. The separatrix between the two elements of that partition
are indicated by the bold line. Finally, in all elements of U,
the sky either will be clear at noon or will be cloudy. The two
possibilities are indicated by the two colored rectangles.
The ID weakly infers Γ, i.e., correctly predicts the state of
the sky at noon, since whichever of the two possible questions
it considers, it is guaranteed that its answer is correct.
A related scenario where weak inference does not hold is
illustrated in Fig. 2. The only difference from the scenario
depicted in Fig. 1 is that if the ID is asked the question, “will
the sky be cloudy at noon?”, and the sky in fact will be cloudy
at noon, the ID will answer ’no’ — which is incorrect.
Example 4. While it is clearly grounded in a real-world sce-
nario, Ex. 3 obscures the mathematical essence of weak infer-
6T = Cloudy sky at noon T = Clear sky at noon
Q: Sky clear 
at noon?A: Yes
A: No
Q: Sky cloudy
at noon?
Q: Sky clear 
at noon?
Q: Sky cloudy
at noon?
FIG. 2. An example where the prediction of an ID of the state of the
sky at noon cannot be guaranteed of being correct, i.e., the ID does
not weakly infer the function of u giving the state of the sky at noon.
The scenario is identical to the one depicted in Fig. 1, except that if
the ID is asked the question, “will the sky be cloudy at noon?”, and
the sky in fact will be cloudy at noon, the ID will answer ’no’, which
is incorrect.
ence. A fully abstract, stripped-down example of weak infer-
ence is given in the following table, which provides functions
X(u),Y(u) and Γ(u) for all u in a space U. In this minimal
example, U has only three elements:
u X(u) Y(u) Γ(u)
a 1 1 1
b 2 -1 1
c 1 -1 2
In this example, Γ(U) = {1, 2}, so we are concerned with two
probes, δ1 and δ2. Setting X(u) = 2 means that u = b, which in
turn means that Γ(u) = 1 and Y(u) = −1. So setting X(u) = 2
guarantees that Γ(u) , 2, and so δ2(Γ(u)) = Y(u) (which in
this case equals -1, the answer ’no’). So the setup value x =
2 ensures that the ID correctly answers the binary question,
“does Γ(u) = 2?”, in the negative. Similarly, setting X(u) = 1
guarantees that δ1(Γ(u)) = Y(u), so that it ensures that the ID
correctly answers the binary question, “does Γ(u) = 1?”, in
the positive.
Ex. 4 shows that weak inference can hold even if X(u) =
x doesn’t always fix a unique value for Y(u). Such non-
uniqueness is typical when the device is being used for ob-
servation. Setting up a device to observe a variable outside of
that device restricts the set of possible universes; only those
u are allowed that are consistent with the observation device
being set up that way to make the desired observation. But
typically just setting up an observation device to observe what
value a variable has doesn’t uniquely fix the value of that vari-
able.
As discussed in App. B of [39], the definition of weak infer-
ence is very unrestrictive. For example, a device D is ‘given
credit’ for correctly answering probe δ(Γ(u)) if there is any
x ∈ X(U) such that X(u) = x ⇒ Y(u) = δ(Γ(u)). In partic-
ular, D is given credit even if the binary question we would
associate with x (under some particular physical interpretation
of what X, like in Ex. 1 and Ex. 2) is not whether Γ(u) = γ,
but some other question. In essence, the device receives credit
even if it gets the right answer by accident.
Unless specified otherwise, a device written as “Di” for any
integer i is implicitly presumed to have domain U, with setup
function Xi and conclusion function Yi (and similarly for no
subscript). Similarly, unless specified otherwise, expressions
like “minxi ” mean minxi∈Xi(U).
The two Laplace’s Demon theorems
“An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces
that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of
which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast
enough ... nothing would be uncertain and the future just like
the past would be present before its eyes.”
— Pierre Simon Laplace, “A Philosophical Essay on Proba-
bilities”
There are limitations on the ability of any device to weakly
infer functions. Perhaps the most trivial is the following:
Proposition 1. For any device D, there is a function that D
does not infer.
Proof. Choose Γ to be the function Y , so that the device
is trying to infer itself. Then choose the negation probe
δ(y ∈ B) = −y to see that such inference is impossible. (Also
see [39].) 
It is interesting to consider the implications of Prop. 1 for
the case where the inference is prediction, as in Ex. 2. De-
pending on how precisely one interprets Laplace, Prop. 1
means that he was wrong in his claim about the ability of an
“intellect” to make accurate predictions: even if the universe
were a giant clock, it could not contain an intellect that could
reliably predict the universe’s future state before it occurred.6
6Similar conclusions have been reached previously [28, 31]. However in addi-
tion to being limited to the inference process of prediction, that earlier work
is quite informal. It is no surprise than that some claims in that earlier work
are refuted by well-established results in engineering. For example, the claim
in [28] that “a prediction concerning the narrator’s future ... cannot ... account
for the effect of the narrator’s learning that prediction” is just not true; it is
refuted by adaptive control theory in general and by Bellman’s equations in
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FIG. 3. The time t1 is less than t2, which in turn is less than noon. V is
the set of all time-t2 universes where Laplace is thinking the answer
“yes” in response to the t1 question Laplace heard — whatever that
question was. V ′ is V evolved forward to noon. At t1, we ask Laplace,
“will the universe be outside V ′ at noon?” It is impossible for Laplace
to answer correctly, no matter what his computational capabilities
are, what the laws of the universe are, etc.
More precisely, for all Γ as in Prop. 1, there could be an in-
tellect D that can infer Γ. However Prop. 1 tells us that for
any fixed intellect, there must exist a Γ that the intellect can-
not infer. (See Fig. 3.) The “intellect” Laplace refers to is
commonly called Laplace’s “demon”, so I sometimes refer to
Prop. 1 as the “first (Laplace’s) demon theorem”.
One might think that Laplace could circumvent the first de-
mon theorem by simply constructing a second demon, specif-
ically designed to infer the Γ that thwarts his first demon.
Continuing in this way, one might think that Laplace could
construct a set of demons that, among them, could infer any
function Γ. Then he could construct an “overseer demon” that
would choose among those demons, based on the function Γ
that needs to be inferred. However this is not possible. To see
this, simply redefine the deviceD in Prop. 1 to be the combi-
nation of Laplace with all of his demons.
These limitations on prediction hold even if the number of
possible states of the universe is countable (or even finite), or
if the inference device has super-Turning capabilities. It holds
even if the current formulation of physics is wrong; it does not
rely on chaotic dynamics, physical limitations like the speed
of light, or quantum mechanical limitations.
Note as well that in Ex. 2’s model of a prediction system
the actual values of the times of the various events are not
specified. So in particular the impossibility result of Prop. 1
still applies to that example even if t3 < t2 — in which case the
time when the agent provides the prediction is after the event
they are predicting. Moreover, consider the variant of Ex. 2
where the agent programs a computer to do the prediction, as
discussed in Footnote 3 in that example. In this variant, the
program that is input to the prediction computer could even
particular. Similarly, it is straightforward to see that statements (A3), (A4),
and the notion of “structurally identical predictors” in [31] have no formal
meaning.
contain the future value that the agent wants to predict. Prop. 1
would still mean that the conclusion that the agent using the
computer comes to after reading the computer’s output cannot
be guaranteed to be correct.
Prop. 1 tells us that any inference device D can be
“thwarted” by an associated function. However it does not
forbid the possibility of some second device that can infer that
function that thwarts D. To analyze issues of this sort, and
more generally to analyze the inference relationships within
sets of multiple functions and multiple devices, we start with
the following definition:
Definition 3. Two devices (X1,Y1) and (X2,Y2) are (setup)
distinguishable iff ∀x1, x2,∃u ∈ U such that X1(u) =
x1, X2(u) = x2.
No device is distinguishable from itself. Distinguishability is
symmetric, but non-transitive in general (and obviously not
reflexive).
Having two devices be distinguishable means that no mat-
ter how the first device is set up, it is always possible to set
up the second one in an arbitrary fashion; the setting up of
the first device does not preclude any options for setting up
the second one. Intuitively, if two devices are not distinguish-
able, then the setup function of one of the devices is partially
“controlled” by the setup function of the other one. In such a
situation, they are not two fully separate, independent devices.
I will say that one ID (X,Y) can weakly infer a second one,
(X′,Y ′), if it can weakly infer the conclusion of the second ID,
Y ′. (See [39] for an example.)
Proposition 2. No two distinguishable devices (X,Y) and
(X′,Y ′) can weakly infer each other.7
I will call Prop. 2 the “second (Laplace’s) demon theorem”.
See Fig. 4 for an illustration of Prop. 2, for two IDs called
“Bob” and “Alice”, in which they do not directly infer one
another’s conclusion, but rather infer functions of those con-
clusions.
This second Laplace’s demon theorem establishes that a
whole class of functions cannot be inferred byD (namely the
conclusion functions of devices that are distinguishable from
D and also can inferD). More generally, let S be a set of de-
vices, all of which are distinguishable from one another. Then
the second demon theorem says that there can be at most one
device in S that can infer all other devices in S. It is impor-
tant to note that the distinguishability condition is crucial to
the second demon theorem; mutual weak inference can occur
between non-distinguishable devices.
In [8] Barrow speculated whether “only computable pat-
terns are instantiated in physical reality”. There “computable”
is defined in the sense of Turing machine theory. However we
7In fact we can strengthen this result: If (X′,Y′) can weakly infer the distin-
guishable device (X,Y), then (X,Y) can infer neither of the two binary-valued
functions equivalent to Y′.
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FIG. 4. The time t1 is less than t2, which in turn is less than noon.
V is the set of all time-t2 universes where Bob is thinking the answer
“yes” in response to the t1 question Bob heard — whatever that ques-
tion was. W is the set of all time-t2 universes where Alice is thinking
the answer “yes” in response to the t1 question Alice heard — what-
ever that question was. V ′ is V evolved forward to noon, and W ′ is
W evolved forward to noon. At t1, we ask Bob, “will the universe
be in W ′ at noon?” (i.e., “is Alice thinking ‘yes’ at t2?”). At that
time we also ask Alice, “will the universe be outside of V ′ at noon?”
(i.e., “is Bob not thinking ‘yes’ at t2?”). It is impossible for both Bob
and Alice to answer correctly, no matter what their computational
capabilities are, what the laws of the universe are, etc.
can also consider the term as meaning “can be evaluated by a
real world computer”. If so, then his question is answered —
in the negative — by the Laplace demon theorems.
By combining the two demon theorems it is possible to es-
tablish the following:
Corollary 3. Consider a pair of devices D = (X,Y) and
D′ = (X′,Y ′) that are distinguishable from one another and
whose conclusion functions are inequivalent. Say that D′
weakly infers D. Then there are at least three inequivalent
surjective binary functions Γ thatD does not infer.
In particular, Coroll. 3 means that if any device in a set of dis-
tinguishable devices with inequivalent conclusion functions is
sufficiently powerful to infer all the others, then each of those
others must fail to infer at least three inequivalent functions.
Strong inference — inference of entire functions
As considered in computer science theory, a computer is
an entire map taking an arbitrary “input” given by the value
of a physical variable, Γ1(u), to an “output” also given by the
value of a physical variable, Γ2(u) [22]. It is concerned with
saying how the value of Γ2(u) would change if the value of
Γ1(u) changed. So it is concerned with two separate physical
variables. In contrast, weak inference is only concerned with
inferring the value of a single physical variable, Γ(u), not the
relationship between two variables.
So we cannot really say that a device “infers a computer”
if we only use the weak inference concept analyzed above. In
this subsection we extend the theory of inference devices to
include inference of entire functions. In addition to allowing
us to analyze inference of computers, this lays the groundwork
for the analysis in the next section of the relation between in-
ference and algorithmic information theory.
To begin, suppose we have a function f that relates two
physical variables. Since those two variables are themselves
functions defined over U, in general f is not. To be more
precise, suppose that there are two function S and T defined
over U, where S refines T , and that for all s ∈ S (u), f (s) =
T (S −1(s)) is single-valued. We want to define what it means
for a device to be able to “emulate” the entire mapping taking
any s ∈ S (U) to the associated value f (s) = T (S −1(s)).
One way to do this is to strengthen the concept of weak in-
ference, so that for any desired input value s ∈ S (U), the ID in
question can simultaneously infer the output value f (s) while
also forcing the input to have the value s. In other words,
for any pair (s ∈ S (U), t ∈ T (U)), by appropriate choice of
x ∈ X(U) the ID (X,Y) simultaneously answers the probe
δt correctly (as in the concept of weak inference) and forces
S (u) = s. In this way, when the ID “answers δt correctly”, it
is answering whether f (s) = t correctly, for the precise s that
it is setting. By being able to do this for all s ∈ S (U), the ID
can emulate the function f .
Extending this concept from single-valued functions f to
include multivalued functions results in the following defini-
tion:
Definition 4. Let S and T be functions both defined over U. A
device (X,Y) strongly infers (S ,T ) iff ∀ δ ∈ P(T ) and all s ∈
S (U), ∃ x such that X(u) = x⇒ {S (u) = s,Y(u) = δ(T (u))}.
If (X,Y) strongly infers (S ,T ) we write (X,Y)  (S ,T ).
By considering the special case where T (U) = B, we can
use strong inference to formalize what it means for one device
to emulate another device:
Definition 5. A device (X1,Y1) strongly infers a device
(X2,Y2) iff ∀ δ ∈ P(Y2) and all x2, ∃ x1 such that X1 = x1 ⇒
X2 = x2,Y1 = δ(Y2).
See App. B in [39] for a discussion of how unrestrictive Def. 5
is.
Def. 5 might seem peculiar, since (X,Y)  (S ,T ) means
that in a certain sense the function X controls what the input to
the function s → T (S −1(S )) is. However, by a simple change
in perspective of what device is doing the strong inference,
we can see that Def. 5 applies even to scenarios that (before
the change in perspective) do not involve such control. This is
illustrated in the following example:
Example 5. SupposeD2 is a device that (for example) can be
used to make predictions about the future state of the weather.
Let Γ be the set of future weather states that the device can
predict, and let X2 be the set of possible current meteorolog-
ical conditions. So if this device can in fact infer the future
state of the weather, then for any question δγ of whether the
future weather will have value γ, there is some current condi-
tion x2 such that if D2 is set up with that x2, it correctly an-
swers whether the associated future state of the weather will
9be γ. On the other hand, if D2 ≯ Γ, then there is some such
question of the form, “will the future weather be γ?” such
that for no input to the device of the current meteorological
conditions will the device necessarily produce an answer y2
to the question that is correct.
One way for us to be able to conclude that some device
D′ = (X′,Y ′) can “emulate” this behavior of D2 is to set up
D2 with an arbitrary value x2, and confirm that D′ can infer
the associated value of Y2. So we require that for all x2, and
all δ ∈ P(Y2), ∃x′ such that if X2 = x2 and X′ = x′, then
Y = δ(Y2).
Now define a new deviceD1, with its setup function defined
by X1(u) = (X′(u), X2(u)) and its conclusion function equal to
Y ′. Then our condition for confirming that D′ can emulate
D2 gets replaced by the condition that for all x2, and all δ ∈
P(Y2), ∃x1 such that if X1 = x1, then X2 = x2 and Y = δ(Y2).
This is precisely the definition of strong inference.
Say we have a Turing machine (TM) T1 that can emulate
another TM, T2 (e.g., T1 could be a universal Turing machine
(UTM), able to emulate any other TM). Such “emulation”
means that T1 can perform any particular calculation that T2
can. The analogous relationship holds for IDs, if we translate
“emulate” to “strongly infer”, and translate “perform a partic-
ular calculation” to “weakly infer”. In addition, like UTM-
style emulation (but unlike weak inference), strong inference
is transitive. These results are formalized as follows:
Proposition 4. Let D1, D2 and D3 be a set of inference de-
vices over U and Γ a function over U. Then:
i)D1  D2 andD2 > Γ⇒D1 > Γ.
ii)D1  D2 andD2  D3 ⇒D1  D3.
In addition, strong inference implies weak inference, i.e.,
D1  D2 ⇒ D1 > D2.
Most of the properties of weak inference have analogs for
strong inference:
Proposition 5. LetD1 be a device over U.
i) There is a deviceD2 such thatD1 4 D2.
ii) Say that ∀ x1, |X−11 (x1)| > 2. Then there is a device D2
such thatD2  D1.
Strong inference also obeys a restriction that is analogous
to Prop. 2, except that there is no requirement of setup-
distinguishability:
Proposition 6. No two devices can strongly infer each other.
Recall that there are entire functions that are not com-
putable by any TM, in the sense that no TM can correctly
compute the value of that function for every input to that func-
tion. On the other hand, trivially, any single output value of a
function can be computed by some TM (just choose the TM
that prints that value and then halts). The analogous distinc-
tion holds for inference devices:
Proposition 7. Let U be any countable space with at least
two elements.
1. For any function Γ over U such that |Γ(U)| ≥ 3 there is
a deviceD that weakly infers Γ;
2. There is a (vector-valued) function (S ,T ) over U that is
not strongly inferred by any device.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Let X(u) be the identity
function (so that each u ∈ U has its own, unique value x).
Choose Y(u) to equal 1 for exactly one u, u¯. Then whatever the
value γ := Γ(u¯) ∈ Γ(U) happens to be, for the probe δγ we can
choose x = X(u¯), so that the device correctly answers ‘yes’ to
the question of whether Γ(u) = Γ(u¯). For any other probe δγ′ ,
note that since |Γ(U)| ≥ 3, there must be a u′ ∈ U such that
Γ(u′) , γ′. Moreover, by construction Y(u′) = −1. So if we
choose x to be X(u′), then the device correctly answers ‘no’ to
the question of whether Γ(u′) = γ′. Since this is true for any
γ′ , Γ(u¯), this completes a proof of the first claim.
We also prove the second claim by construction. Choose
both S and T to be the identity function, i.e., S (u) = u and
T (u) = u for all u, so that |S (U)| = |T (U)| = |U |. So by
the first requirement for some device (X,Y) to strongly infer
(S ,T ), it must be that for any s, there is a value of X, x(s),
such that X(u) = x(s) ⇒ S (u) = s. Since S is a bijection, this
means that x(s) must be a single-valued function, for each s
choosing a unique (x which in turn chooses a unique) u. Since
T is also a bijection, this means that Y(X−1(x(s)) must equal 1,
in order for the device to correctly answer ‘yes’ to the probe
of whether T (u) = δT (S −1(s)). However since this is true for
all s ∈ S (U), it is true for all u ∈ U. So Y(U) is a singleton,
contradicting the requirement that the conclusion function of
any device be binary-valued. 
INFERENCE IN STOCHASTIC UNIVERSES
Stochastic inference
There are several ways to extend the analysis above to in-
corporate a probability measure P over U, so that inference is
not exact, but only holds under some probability. In this sub-
section we present some of the elementary properties of one
such measure of stochastic inference.
Once there is a distribution over U, all functions like X,
Y and Γ become random variables. Now recall that δγ(Γ) is
shorthand for the function u ∈ U → δγ(Γ(u)) — and so now
it is a random variable. Bearing this in mind, the measure of
stochastic inference we will consider here is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 6. Let P(u ∈ U) be a probability measure and Γ a
function with domain U and finite range. Then we say that a
device (X,Y) (weakly) infers Γ with (covariance) accuracy
cov(D,Γ) :=
∑
δ∈P(Γ) maxx
[
EP(Yδ(Γ) | x)]
|Γ(U)|
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Writing it out explicitly, for countable U, the numerator in
Def. 6 is ∑
γ∈Γ(U)
max
x∈X(U)
[∑
u
Y(u)δγ(Γ(u))P(u | x)
]
(4)
Intuitively, this is a probe-averaged, best-case (over x ∈ X(U))
probability of answering the probe correctly.
Covariance accuracy is a way to quantify the degree to
which D > Γ when the inference is subject to uncertainty.
Clearly, cov(D,Γ) ≤ 1.0, and if P is nowhere 0, then
cov(D,Γ) = 1.0 iff D > Γ.8 Covariance accuracy obeys the
following bound:
Proposition 8. Let P be a probability measure over U, D =
(X,Y) a device, and Γ a function over U with finite |Γ(U)|.
Then
cov(D,Γ) ≥ (2 − |Γ(U)|) maxx
[
EP(Y | x)]
|Γ(U)|
Proof. For any probe δγ of γ ∈ Γ(U), let Mγ =
maxx
[
EP(Yδγ(Γ) | x)]. Define xm := argmaxx[EP(Y | x)].
Then Mγ ≥ EP(Yδγ(Γ) | xm) and
cov(D,Γ) =
∑
γ∈Γ(U) Mγ
|Γ(U)| ≥
∑
γ∈Γ(U) EP(Yδγ(Γ) | xm)
|Γ(U)|
=
∑
u P(u | xm) ∑γ Y(u)δγ(Γ(u))
|Γ(U)|
=
∑
u P(u | xm)(2 − |Γ(U)|)Y(u)
|Γ(U)|
=
(2 − |Γ(U)|)EP(Y | xm)
|Γ(U)|
=
(2 − |Γ(U)|) maxx [EP(Y | x)]
|Γ(U)| .

This bound is sharp, as can be seen from the following exam-
ple.
Example 6. Fix some device D and a value |Γ(U)| < ∞.
Next divide each cell of the partition X × Y into |Γ(U)| parts
and assign them equal probability. Also map those cells to
1, . . . , |Γ(U)|, so that Γ(U) = {1, . . . , |Γ(U)|}. For any given
x ∈ X, let ax = P(Y = 1 | x), bx = P(Y = −1 | x). For any
x ∈ X(U), γ ∈ Γ(U) and associated probe δγ,
EP(Yδγ(Γ) | x) = ax + (|Γ(U)| − 1)bx − (|Γ(U)| − 1)ax + bx|Γ(U)|
=
(2 − |Γ(U)|)(ax − bx)
|Γ(U)| =
(2 − |Γ(U)|)EP(Y | x)
|Γ(U)| .
8A subtlety with the definition of an inference devices arises in this stochastic
setting: we can either require that Y be surjective, as in Def. 1, or instead
require that Y be “stochastically surjective” in the sense that ∀y ∈ B, ∃u with
non-zero probability such that Y(u) = y. The distinction between requiring
surjectivity and stochastic surjectivity of Y will not arise here.
We can use this to evaluate
Mγ := max
x
[
EP(Yδγ(Γ) | x)]
=
(2 − |Γ(U)|) maxx [EP(Y | x)]
|Γ(U)|
Since this is the same for all probe parameter values γ,
cov(D,Γ) = (2 − |Γ(U)|) maxx
[
EP(Y | x)]
|Γ(U)|
which establishes the claim.
The term 2−|Γ(U)||Γ(U)| in Prop. 8 depends only on the size of the
space Γ(U).9 The other term, maxx
(
EP(Y | x)), can be viewed
as a measure of the “inference power” of the device, by anal-
ogy with the power of a statistical test. It quantifies the de-
vice’s ability to say ‘yes’.
In the previous section some a priori restrictions on the ca-
pabilities of IDs were presented. These restrictions involved
whether certain properties of IDs can(not) be guaranteed with
complete certainty. When we have a probability distribution
over U it is appropriate to replace consideration of “guar-
anteed” properties with consideration of properties that are
likely but not necessarily guaranteed, e.g., as quantified with
covariance accuracy. When we do that the restrictions of the
previous section get modified, sometimes quite substantially.
This is illustrated in the next two propositions.
First, by Prop. 4(i), if for devices D1, D2 and function Γ,
D1  D2 andD2 > Γ, thenD1 > Γ. In covariance terms, this
says that ifD1  D2 and cov(D2,Γ) = 1.0, then cov(D1,Γ) =
1.0. What happens to cov(D1,Γ) if cov(D2,Γ) < 1.0? A par-
tial answer is given by the following result:
Proposition 9. There are devicesD,D′, probability distribu-
tion P defined over U, and function Γ, such thatD′  D and
cov(D,Γ) is arbitrarily close to 1.0 while cov(D′,Γ) = 0.
Proof. The proof is by example.
Let U have ten states, labeled A, . . . , J and suppose that the
functions P,Γ,D = (X,Y) and D′ = (X′,Y ′) are as in Fig. 5,
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
1. To verify that D′  D, for the 1-probe, for x = 1, 2,
choose x′ = 1, 3, respectively. For the −1-probe, for
x = 1, 2, choose x′ = 2, 4, respectively.
2. cov(D,Γ) = p. To see this, for the 1-probe, evalu-
ate maxx EP(Yδ1(Γ) | x) = p, the maximum occur-
ring for x = 1. Similarly, for the −1-probe, evaluate
maxx EP(Yδ−1(Γ) | x) = p, the maximum occurring for
x = 2.
3. cov(D′,Γ) = 0. To see this for both probes, note that
EP(Y ′δ(Γ) | x′) = 0 for each x′.
9Note that this term [2 − |Γ(U)|] / |Γ(U)| can be negative for |Γ(U)| > 2. This
reflects our use of expected values and the convention that B = {−1, 1}.
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(X,Y) (X',Y') ! '(.)
A (1,1) (1,1) 1 (1+-+-)./
B (1.-1) (1.-1) 1 1
C (1,1) (2,-1) 1 1
D (1,-1) (2,1) 1 1
E (2,1) (3,1) -1 1
F (2,-1) (3,-1) -1 1
G (2,1) (4,-1) -1 1
H (2,-1) (4,1) -1 1
I (1,1) (5,1) 1 -.2
J (2,-1) (5,-1) 1 1
FIG. 5. Specification of a scenario in which the stochastic version of
Prop. 4(i), concerning “transitivity” of weak inference through strong
inference, fails drastically.
The proof is completed by taking p→ 1. 
To understand Prop. 9, recall that the definition of D′ 
D requires that for any x ∈ X(U) and for any probe δγ ∈
P(Γ), there be some x′ and associated X′−1(x′) ⊆ U for which
D′ successfully emulates D’s behavior at inferring δγ. If the
inferenceD > Γ is perfect, thenD′ also infers Γ. However, if
the inference D > Γ is only partially correct, then that value
x′ and associated subset of U, under which D′  D may be
precisely those u for which D performs badly at inferring δγ.
Thus,Dmay do an excellent, though imperfect, job overall of
inferring Γ whileD′ fails completely.
The second example of how the restrictions of the previous
section get modified by introducing a probability distribution
is that this makes the second Laplace’s impossibility theorem
become “barely true”:
Proposition 10. There are devices D and D′ with X and
X′ setup-distinguishable and a distribution P where both
cov(D,D′) and cov(D′,D) are arbitrarily close to 1.
Proof. The proof is by example.
Let U have sixteen states, labeled A, . . ., P and suppose
that the functions P,Γ,D = (X,Y) and D′ = (X′,Y ′) are as in
Fig. 6, with arbitrary 0 < b < 1/6, and a = (1 − 6b)/2.
By inspection, X and X′ are setup distinguishable. Next,
plugging in yields cov(D,D′) = cov(D,Y ′) = a/(a + b).
Moreover cov(D′,D) = cov(D,D′) by symmetry of the
columns in Fig. 6. (EP(YY ′ | X = 1) = (a − b)/(a + b) and
EP(YY ′ | X = −1) = −1.)
So by taking b arbitrarily close to 0, both of the covariances
can be made arbitrarily close to 1. 
Prop. 10 shows that in a certain sense, as soon as any
stochasticity is introduced into the universe, having two de-
vices be setup-distinguishable no longer restricts their ability
to simultaneously infer each other. However if we replace
setup-distinguishability with the property that the setup func-
tions of the two devices are statistically independent, then we
recover strong restrictions on simultaneous inference.
(X,Y) (X',Y') P()
A (1,1) (1,1) a
B (1,1) (1,-1) 0
C (1,-1) (1,1) 0
D (1,-1) (1,-1) a
E (1,1) (-1,1) 0
F (1,1) (-1,-1) b
G (1,-1) (-1,1) b
H (1,-1) (-1,-1) 0
I (-1,1) (1,1) 0
J (-1,1) (1,-1) b
K (-1,-1) (1,1) b
L (-1,-1) (1,-1) 0
M (-1,1) (-1,1) 0
N (-1,1) (-1,-1) b
O (-1,-1) (-1,1) b
P (-1,-1) (-1,1) 0
FIG. 6. Specification of a scenario in which the stochastic ver-
sion of Prop. 2, concerning simultaneous inference of two setup-
distinguishable IDs, fails drastically.
To illustrate this, let M be the four-dimensional hypercube
{0, 1}4. Define the following three functions over ~z ∈ M:
1. k(~z) = z1 + z4 − z2 − z3;
2. m(~z) = (z2 − z4);
3. n(~z) = (z3 − z4).
Proposition 11. Let P be a probability measure over U, and
D1 and D2 two devices where X1(U) = X2(U) = B, and
those variables are statistically independent under P. Define
P(X1 = −1) ≡ α and P(X2 = −1) ≡ β. Say that D1 infers D2
with accuracy 1, whileD2 infersD2 with accuracy 2. Then
12 ≤ max~z∈M
∣∣∣αβ[k(~z)]2 + αk(~z)m(~z) + βk(~z)n(~z) + m(~z)n(~z)∣∣∣.
In particular, if α = β = 1/2, then
12 ≤ max~z∈M | (z1 − z4)
2 − (z2 − z3)2 |
4
= 1/4.
The maximum for α = β = 1/2 can occur in several ways.
One is when z1 = 1, and z2, z3, z4 all equal 0. At these values,
both devices have an inference accuracy of 1/2 at inferring
each other. Each device achieves that accuracy by perfectly
inferring one probe of the other device, while performing ran-
domly for the remaining probe.
The ID framework as developed to date has no function
measuring distance, nor one measuring time. So at present,
one cannot even formulate an ID-analog of Heisenberg’s un-
certainty principle, never mind try to derive it. It is intrigu-
ing that despite this, Prop. 11 is a bound on the product of
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uncertainties, exactly like Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
This suggests it may be worth exploring extensions of the ID
framework that do involve distance and time, to see what a
priori constraints there might be on the product of uncertain-
ties of two IDs that are measuring different aspects of the same
system. (This idea is returned to in the last section below.)
Finally, it should be noted that there are other ways to quan-
tify the degree of weak inference when there is intrinsic un-
certainty, in addition to covariance accuracy. For example, we
could change Def. 6 by replacing the sum over all probes δ and
associated division by |Γ(U)| with a minimum over all probes
δ. (This amounts to replacing an average-best-case expression
with a worst-case expression.)
The complexity of inference
Constraints on what can be computed by a physical device
can be derived from the laws of physics [25]. There have
also been attempts to go the other way, and derive constraints
on the laws of physics from computation theory, in particular
from algorithmic information theory (AIT) [13, 23, 43–46].
These often implicitly involve uncertainty about the state of
the universe. For example, the use of Kolmogorov complex-
ity to model physical reality is often intimately related to the
use of algorithmic probability [23, 33, 47]. (Indeed, the very
first line in [33] is “The probability distribution P from which
the history of our universe is sampled represents a theory of
everything”.) One way to justify consideration of such a prob-
ability distribution in the first place is to identify it with un-
certainty of some agent (e.g., a scientist) concerning the state
of the universe.
This importance of an agent in attempts to analyze physics
using AIT suggests we extend the inference device framework
to include structures similar to those considered in AIT. There
are several ways to extend the ID framework this way. In this
subsection I sketch the starting point for one of them.
Given a TM T , the Kolmogorov complexity of an output
string s is defined as the size of the smallest input string s′
that when input to T produces s as output. To construct our
inference device analog of this, we need to define the “size”
of an input region of an inference device D. To do this, we
assume we are given a measure dµ over U, and for simplicity
restrict attention to functions Γ over U with countable range.
Then we define the size of γ ∈ Γ(U) as -ln[ ∫
Γ−1(γ) dµ(u) 1
]
,
i.e., the negative logarithm of the measure of all u ∈ U such
that Γ(u) = γ.10 We write this size asMµ;Γ(γ), or justM(γ)
for short.11
10As usual, if U is countable, µ is a point measure, and the integral is a sum.
11If
∫
dµ(u) 1 = ∞, then we instead work with differences in logarithms of
volumes, evaluated under an appropriate limit of dµ that takes
∫
dµ(u) 1 →
∞. For example, we might work with such differences when U is taken to be
a box whose size goes to infinity.
We define inference complexity in terms of such a size
function using the shorthand introduced just below Eq. (2):
Definition 7. LetD be a device and Γ a function over U where
X(U) and Γ(U) are countable and D > Γ. The inference
complexity of Γ with respect to D and measure µ is defined
as
Cµ(Γ;D) ,
∑
δ∈P(Γ)
minx:X=x⇒Y=δ(Γ)[Mµ,X(x)].
In the sequel I will often have the measure implicit, and (for
example) simply write C rather than Cµ. I will also mostly
restrict attention to the case where µ is either a distribution or
a semi-measure.12
As an example, for the case where inference models the
process of prediction, Γ corresponds to a potential future state
of some system S external toD. In this case C(Γ;D) is a mea-
sure of how difficult it currently is forD to predict that future
state of S . Loosely speaking, the more sensitively that future
state depends on current conditions, the greater the inference
complexity of predicting that future state.
Inference complexity of any function Γ with respect to a
device (X,Y) is bounded by the Shannon entropy of µ(X):
Proposition 12. For any IDD, probability distribution µ, and
function Γ with a countable image such thatD > Γ,
Cµ(Γ;D) ≤ |Γ| × Hµ(X)
where Hµ(X) is the Shannon entropy of µ(X).
Proof. Expand∑
δ∈P(Γ)
min
x:X=x⇒Y= f (Γ)
[Mµ,X(x)] ≤
∑
x∈X(U)
Mµ,X(x)
≤ −|Γ|
∑
x∈X(U)
log2µ(x)
|Γ|
≤ |Γ|Hµ(X)

Kolmogorov complexity concerns TMs computing a single
output, rather than TMs emulating an entire function from in-
puts to outputs. The field of algorithmic information theory
then analyzes the relation between Kolmogorov complexity
and UTMs, i.e., TMs that emulate entire functions from in-
puts to outputs. Analogously, inference complexity concerns
inferring a single value of a variable, i.e., it is defined in terms
of weak inference. So to investigate the inference device ana-
log of algorithmic information theory means investigating the
relation between inference complexity and IDs that emulate
12A natural alternative measure of “inference complexity” is given by replacing
the sum over all probes in Def. 7 with a max over all probes, so that we are
analyzing the hardest possible question to ask about Γ. In the interests of
space, we leave this for future work.
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entire functions — which involves strong inference instead of
weak inference.
To begin, recall perhaps the most fundamental result in AIT,
the invariance theorem. This theorem gives an upper bound
on the difference between the Kolmogorov complexity of a
string using a particular UTM T1 and its complexity if using a
different UTM, T2. This bound is independent of the compu-
tation to be performed, and can be viewed as the Kolmogorov
complexity of T1 emulating T2. Similarly, we can bound how
much greater the inference complexity of a function can be
for a device D1 than it is for a different device D2 if D1 can
strongly inferD2:
Proposition 13. LetD1 andD2 be two devices and Γ a func-
tion over U where Γ(U) is finite,D1  D2, andD2 > Γ. Then
for any distribution µ,
Cµ(Γ;D1) − Cµ(Γ;D2) ≤ |Γ(U)| ×
maxx2
(
min
x1:{X1=x1⇒X2=x2,Y1=Y2}
[Mµ,X1 (x1) −Mµ,X2 (x2)]
)
.
Note that since Mµ,X1 (x1) − Mµ,X2 (x2) = ln
[
µ(X−12 (x2))
µ(X−11 (x1))
]
, the
bound in Prop. 13 is independent of the units with which
one measures volume in U. (Cf. footnote 11.) Further-
more, it is always true that X1 = x1 ⇒ X2 = x2,Y1 = Y2
iff X−11 (x1) ⊆ X−12 (x2) ∩ (Y1Y2)−1(1). Accordingly, for all
(x1, x2) pairs arising in the bound in Prop. 13,
µ(X−12 (x2))
µ(X−11 (x1))
≥ 1.
So the upper bound in Prop. 13 is always non-negative.
The max-min expression on the RHS of Prop. 13 is inde-
pendent of Γ. So the bound in Prop. 13 is independent of
all aspects of Γ except the cardinality of Γ(U). Intuitively,
the bound is |Γ(U)| times the worst-case amount of “computa-
tional work” thatD1 has to do to “emulate”D2’s behavior for
some particular value of x2.
Suppose that it takes a lot of computational work forD2 to
infer Γ, and so it also takes a lot of computational work forD1
to infer Γ by emulating D2. However, it might take very little
work for D1 to infer Γ directly. In fact, it may even be that
C(Γ;D1) < C(Γ;D2):
Proposition 14. There are devices D, D′, probability distri-
bution P defined over U, and function Γ, such that D > Γ,
D′  D, and CP(Γ;D) is arbitrarily large, while CP(Γ;D′)
is arbitrarily close to the minimum value of
∣∣∣Γ∣∣∣ × ln(|Γ(U)|).
Proof. The proof is by example.
Let U have twelve states, labeled A, . . . , L and suppose that
the functions P,Γ,D′ = (X,Y) andD = (X,Y) are as in Fig. 7,
with 1/4 < p < 1.
1. To verify that D > Γ, for the 1-probe, choose x = 1.
For the −1 probe, choose x = 2.
2. To verify that D′  D, first, for the 1-probe, for
x = 1, 2, 3, choose x′ = 1, 3, 5, respecitively. Then
for the −1-probe, for x = 1, 2, 3, choose x′ = 2, 4, 6,
respectively.
(X,Y) (X′,Y ′) Γ P(.)
A (1,1) (1,1) 1 (1− p)/8
B (1, -1) (1, -1) -1 ”
C (1, 1) (2, -1) 1 ”
D (1 -1) (2, 1) -1 ”
E (2, 1) (3, 1) -1 ”
F (2, -1) (3, -1) 1 ”
G (2, 1) (4, -1) -1 ”
H (2, -1) (4, 1) 1 ”
I (3, 1) (5, 1) 1 p/4
J (3, -1) (5, -1) -1 ”
K (3, 1) (6, -1) -1 ”
L (3, -1) (6, 1) 1 ”
1
FIG. 7. Scenario illustrating discrepancies of complexities of two
IDs where one strongly infers the other.
3. To verify that C(Γ;D) can be arbitrarily large, first ex-
pand it as −2 ln((1 − p)/2) = 2 ln(2) − 2 ln(1 − p). (For
the 1-probe, x = 1 andMP,X(x) = − ln((1 − p)/2) and
similarly for the -1-probe and x = 2.)
4. To verify that C(Γ;D′) can be arbitrarily close to its
minimal value, write it as −2 ln(p/2) = 2 ln(2)−2 ln(p).
(For the 1-probe, x′ = 5 andMP,X(x) = − ln(p/2) and
similarly for the -1-probe and x′ = 6.)
Finally, by taking p arbitrarily close to 1, C(Γ;D) becomes
arbitrarily large while C(Γ;D′) becomes arbitrarily close to
the minimum of 2 ln(2). 
Although there is not space to analyze them here, it is
worth noting that there are several ways to translate some of
the mathematical structures of algorithmic information theory
into the inference device framework. For example, just as a
given Turing machine may fail to produce an output for some
specific input, so an inference device may fail to reach a con-
clusion for some specific setup. This motivates the following
definition:
Definition 8. A device (X,Y) halts for setup value x iff X =
x⇒ Y = y for some single value y.
We say that x is a “halting setup” if (X,Y) halts for x. Parel-
leling the usual definitions in TM theory, we say that an ID is
total, or recursive iff it halts for all x ∈ X(U). So an ID (X,Y)
is recursive iff X refines Y .
Given this definition of what it means for a device to halt on
a given input, we can define the inference analog of a prefix-
free Turing machine [23]:
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Definition 9. Given a semi-measure µ, a device (X,Y) is
prefix(-free) iff ∑
x:D halts on x
2−Mµ,X (x) ≤ 1
By Kraft’s inequality, if D is prefix-free for a semi-measure
µ, then there is a prefix-free code for the set of all halting
x ∈ X(U). Therefore we can identify that set of x’s with
semi-infinite bit strings, or equivalently with the natural num-
bers [23].
As a final example, note that the min over x’s in Def. 7 is a
direct analog of the min in the definition of Kolmogorov com-
plexity (there the min is over those strings that when input to a
particular UTM result in the desired output string). A natural
modification to Def. 7 is to remove the min by considering all
x’s that cause Y = δ(Γ), not just of one of them:
Cˆ(Γ;D) ,
∑
δ∈P(Γ)
−ln
[
µ
(
∪x:X=x⇒Y=δ(Γ)X−1(x)
) ]
=
∑
δ∈P(Γ)
−ln
 ∑
x:X=x⇒Y=δ(Γ)
e−M(x)
 ,
where the equality follows from the fact that for any x, x′ ,
x, X−1(x) ∩ X−1(x′) = ∅. The argument of the ln(.) in this
modified version of inference complexity has a direct analog
in TM theory: The sum, over all input strings s to a UTM that
generates a desired output string s′, of 2−n(s), where n(s) is the
bit size of s. This is sometimes known as the “algorithmic” or
“Solomonoff” probability of s′ [23] in the theory of TMs.
MODELING THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE IN TERMS OF
INFERENCE DEVICES
I now expand the scope of the discussion to allow sets of
many inference devices and / or many functions to be inferred.
Some of the philosophical implications of the ensuing results
are then discussed in the next subsection.
Formalization of physical reality involving Inference Devices
Define a reality as a pair (U; {Fφ}) where the space U is
the domain of the reality, and {Fφ} is a (perhaps uncount-
able) non-empty set of functions all having domain U. We
are particularly interested in device realities in which some
of the functions are binary-valued, and we wish to pair each
of those functions uniquely with some of the other functions.
In general, not all of the functions in {Fφ} need to be mem-
bers of such a pair. Accordingly, the most general form of
such realities is triples of the form (U; {(Xα,Yα)}; {Γβ}), or just
(U; {Dα}; {Γβ}) for short, where {Dα} is a set of devices over
U and {Γβ} a set of functions over U.
Define a universal device as any device in a reality that can
strongly infer all other devices and weakly infer all functions
in that reality. Prop. 6 means that no reality can contain more
than one universal device. So in particular, if a reality con-
tains a universal device and there is a given distribution over
U, then the reality has a unique natural choice for an infer-
ence complexity measure, namely the inference complexity
with respect to its (unique) universal device. (This contrasts
with Kolmogorov complexity, which depends on the arbitrary
choice of what UTM to use.)
For simplicity, assume the index set φ is countable, with el-
ements φ1, φ2, . . .. It is interesting to consider the reduced
form of a reality (U; {Fφ}), which is defined as the im-
age of the function u → (Fφ1 (u), Fφ2 (u), . . .). In particular,
the reduced form of a device reality is the set of all tuples
([x1, y1], [x2, y2], . . . ; γ1, γ2, . . .) for which ∃ u ∈ U such that
simultaneously X1(u) = x1,Y1(u) = y1, X2(u) = x2,Y2(u) =
y2, . . . ; Γ1(u) = γ1,Γ2(u) = γ2, . . .. By working with reduced
forms of realities, we dispense with the need to explicitly dis-
cuss U entirely.13
Example 7. Take U to be the set of all possible histories of
a universe across all time that are consistent with the laws of
physics. So each u is a specification of a trajectory of the state
of the entire universe through all time. The laws of physics
are then embodied in restrictions on U. For example, if one
wants to consider a universe in which the laws of physics are
time-reversible and deterministic, then we require that no two
distinct members of U can intersect. Similarly, properties like
time-translation invariance can be imposed on U, as can more
elaborate laws involving physical constants.
Next, have {Γβ} be a set of physical characteristics of the
universe, each characteristic perhaps defined in terms of the
values of one or more physical variables at multiple locations
and/or multiple times. Finally, have {Dα} be all prediction /
observation systems concerning the universe that all scientists
might ever be involved in.
In this example the laws of physics are embodied in U.
The implications of those laws for the relationships among
the agent devices {Dα} and the other characteristics of the
universe {Γβ} is embodied in the reduced form of the reality.
Viewing the universe this way, it is the u ∈ U, specifying the
universe’s state for all time, that has “physical meaning”. The
reduced form instead is a logical implication of the laws of
the universe. In particular, our universe’s u picks out the tu-
ple given by the Cartesian product [

αDα(u)] × [

β Γβ(u)]
from all tuples in the reduced form of the reality.
As an alternative we can view the reduced form of the real-
ity itself as encapsulating the “physical meaning” of the uni-
verse. In this alternative u does not have any physical mean-
ing. It is only the relationships among the inferences about
13Note the implication that if we work with reduced realities, all of the non-
stochastic analysis of the previous sections can be reduced to satisfiability
statements concerning sets of categorial variables. For example, the fact that
a device cannot weakly infer itself is equivalent to the statement that there is
no countable space X with at least two elements and associated set of pairs
V = {(xi, yi)} where all yi ∈ B, such that for both probes δ of yi, there is some
value x′ ∈ X such that in all pairs (x′, y) ∈ V, y = δ(y).
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u that one might want to make and the devices with which to
try to make those inferences that has physical meaning. One
could completely change the space U and the functions de-
fined over it, but if the associated reduced form of the reality
does not change, then there is no way that the devices in that
reality, when considering the functions in that reality, can tell
that they are now defined over a different U. In this view, the
laws of physics i.e., a choice for the set U, are simply a cal-
culational shortcut for encapsulating patterns in the reduced
form of the reality. It is a particular instantiation of those pat-
terns that has physical meaning, not some particular element
u ∈ U.
See [36] for another perspective on the relationship be-
tween physical reality and mathematical structures.
Given a reality (U; {(X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . .}), we say that a
pair of devices in it are pairwise (setup) distinguishable if
they are distinguishable. We say that the reality as a whole
is mutually (setup) distinguishable iff ∀ x1 ∈ X1(U), x2 ∈
X2(U), . . . ∃ u ∈ U s.t. X1(u) = x1, X2(u) = x2, . . ..
Proposition 15. i) There exist realities (U;D1,D2,D3) where
each pair of devices is pairwise setup distinguishable and
D1 > D2 > D3 > D1.
ii) There exists no reality (U; {Di : i ∈ N ⊆ N}) where the
devices are mutually distinguishable and for some integer n,
D1 > D2 > . . . > Dn > D1.
iii) There exists no reality (U; {Di : i ∈ N ⊆ N}) where for
some integer n,D1  D2  . . .  Dn  D1.
There are many ways to view a reality that contains a count-
able set of devices {Di} as a graph, for example by having
each node be a device while the edges between the nodes con-
cern distinguishability of the associated devices, or concern
whether one weakly infers the other, etc. In particular, given a
countable reality, define an associated directed graph by iden-
tifying each device with a separate node in the graph, and by
identifying each relationship of the form Di  D j with a
directed edge going from node i to node j. We call this the
strong inference graph of the reality.
Prop. 7(ii) means that no reality with |U | > 3 can have a
universal device if the reality contains all functions defined
over U. Suppose that this is not the case, so that the reality
may contain a universal device. Prop. 6 means that such a
universal device must be a root node of the strong inference
graph of the reality and that there cannot be any other root
node. In addition, by Prop. 4(ii), we know that every node
in a reality’s strong inference graph with successor nodes has
edges that lead directly to every one of those successor nodes
(whether or not there is a universal device in the reality). By
Prop. 15(iii) we also know that a reality’s strong inference
graph is acyclic.
Note that even if a device D1 can strongly infer all other
devices Di>1 in a reality, it may not be able to infer them
simultaneously (strongly or weakly). For example, define
a “composite” function Γ : u → (Y2(u),Y3(u), . . .). Then
the fact that D1 is a universal device does not mean that
∀δ ∈ P(Γ) ∃ x1 : Y1 = δ(Γ). See the discussion in [38] on
“omniscient devices” for more on this point.
We now define what it means for two devices to operate in
an identical manner:
Definition 10. Let U and Uˆ be two (perhaps identical) sets.
Let D1 be a device in a reality with domain U. Let R1 be
the relation between X1 and Y1 specified by the reduced form
of that reality, i.e., x1R1y1 iff the pair (x1, y1) occurs in some
tuple in the reduced form of the reality. Similarly let R2 be the
relation between X2 and Y2 for some separate device D2 in
the reduced form of a reality having domain Uˆ.
Then we say that D1 mimics D2 iff there is an injection,
ρX : X2(Uˆ) → X1(U) and a bijection ρY : Y2(Uˆ) ↔ Y1(U),
such that for ∀x2, y2, x2R2y2 ⇔ ρX(x2)R1ρY (y2). If both D1
mimicsD2 and vice-versa, we say thatD1 andD2 are copies
of each other.
Intuitively, when expressed as devices, two physical sys-
tems are copies if they follow the same inference algorithm
with ρX and ρY translating between those systems. As an ex-
ample, consider the case where U = Uˆ, and we have a reality
over that space that contains two separate physical comput-
ers that are inference devices, both being used for prediction.
If those devices are copies of each other, then they form the
same conclusion for the same value of their setup function,
i.e., they perform the same computation for the same input.
The requirement in Def. 10 that ρY be surjective simply re-
flects the fact that since we’re considering devices, Y1(U) =
Y2(U) = B. Note that because ρX in Def. 10 need not be
surjective, there can be a device in U that mimics multiple
devices in Uˆ. The relation of one device mimicing another
is reflexive and transitive. The relation of two devices being
copies is an equivalence relation.
Say that an inference device D2 is being used for observa-
tion andD1 mimicsD2. The fact thatD1 mimicsD2 does not
imply that D1 can emulate the observation that D2 makes of
some function Γ. The mimicry property only relates D1 and
D2, with no concern for relationships with any third function.
This is why up above we formalized what it means for one
device that “emulates” another in terms of strong inference
rather than in terms of mimicry. Indeed, there are some inter-
esting relationships between what it means for devices to be
copies and what it means for one to strongly infer the other:
Proposition 16. Let D1 be a copy of D2 where both exist in
the same reality.
i) It is possible that D1 and D2 are distinguishable and
D1 > D2, even for finite X1(U), X2(U).
ii) It is possible thatD1  D2, but only if X1(U) and X2(U)
are both infinite.
Philosophical implications
Return now to the case where U is a set of laws of physics
(i.e., the set of all histories consistent with a set of such laws).
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The results above provide general restrictions that must re-
late any devices in such a universe, regardless of the detailed
nature of the laws of that universe. In particular, these re-
sults would have to be obeyed by all universes in a multi-
verse [4, 11, 35].
Accordingly, it is interesting to consider these results from
an informal philosophical perspective. Say we have a device
D in a reality that is distinguishable from the set of all the
other devices in the reality. Such a device can be viewed as
having “free will”, in the limited sense that the way the other
devices are set up does not restrict how D can be set up. Un-
der this interpretation, Prop. 2 means that if two devices both
have free will, then they cannot predict / recall / observe each
other with guaranteed complete accuracy. A reality can have
at most one of its devices that has free will and can predict /
recall / observe / control the other devices in that reality with
guaranteed complete accuracy.14
Prop. 6 then goes further and considers devices that can em-
ulate each other. It shows that independent of concerns of free
will, no two devices can unerringly emulate each other. (In
other words, no reality can have more than one universal de-
vice.) Somewhat tongue in cheek, taken together, these results
could be called a “monotheism theorem”.
Prop. 16 tells us that if there is a universal device in some
reality, then it must be infinite (have infinite X(U)) if there
are other devices in the reality that are copies of it. Now the
time-translation of a physical device is a copy of that device.15
Therefore any physical device that is ever universal must be
infinite. In addition, the impossibility of multiple universal
devices in a reality means that if any physical device is uni-
versal, it can only be so at one moment in time. (Its time-
translation cannot be universal.) Again somewhat tongue in
cheek, taken together this second set of results could be called
an “intelligent design theorem”.
In addition to the questions addressed by the monotheism
and intelligent design theorems, there are many other semi-
philosophical questions one can ask of the form “Can there
14There are other ways to interpret the vague term “free will”. For example,
Lloyd has argued that humans have “free will” in the sense that under the
assumption that they are computationally universal, then due to the Halting
theorem they cannot predict their own future conclusions ahead of time [27].
The fact that an ID cannot even weakly infer itself has analogous implications
that hold under a broader range of assumptions concerning human computa-
tional capability. For example, this implications hold under the assumption
that humans are not computationally universal, or, at the opposite extreme,
under the assumption that they have super-Turing reasoning capability.
15Formally, say that the states of some physical system S at a particular time t
and shortly thereafter at t + δ are identified as the setup and conclusion values
of a device D. In other words, D is given by the functions (X(u),Y(u)) ,
(S (ut), S (ut+δ)). In addition, let RS be the relation between X and Y specified
by the reduced form of the reality containing the system. Say that the time-
translation of D, given by the two functions S (ut′ ) and S (ut′+δ), also obeys
the relation RS . Then the pair of functions (X2(u),Y2(u)) , (S (ut′ ), S (ut′+δ))
is another device that is copy of D. So for example, the same physical com-
puter at two separate pairs of moments is two separate devices, devices that
are copies of each other, assuming they have the same set of allowed compu-
tations.
be a reality with the following properties?”. By formulating
such questions in terms of reduced realities, they can often
be reduced to constraint satisfaction problems, potentially in-
volving infinite-dimensional spaces. In this sense, many of
the questions that have long animated philosophy can be for-
mulated as constraint satisfaction problems.
PHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE
Say that colloquially speaking you “know” the sky’s color
is currently blue, so long as u is in some subset W of all his-
tories. (The reason we consider subsets W is that you cannot
know that the sky’s color is blue in all histories, since in some
histories it will not be blue.) How can we formalize this collo-
quial notion? Well, one thing it means if you “know the sky’s
color is blue” for any u ∈ W is that for such u’s you can ask
yourself “Is the sky green?” and answer ’no’, ask yourself “Is
the sky red?” and answer ’no’, ask yourself “Is the sky blue”
and answer ’yes’, etc., and always be correct in your answer.
So to “know” something implies you can weakly infer it. In-
tuitively speaking, weak inference formalizes an aspect of the
semantic content of “knowledge”.
To properly formalize knowledge of the sky’s color how-
ever, we need to use more structure than is just provided by
weak inference of the sky’s color. The problem is that it is pos-
sible that (X,Y) > Γ even if for each γ ∈ Γ(U), the associated
x that causes Y(u) = δ(γ,Γ(u)) always results in Y(u) = −1.16
Loosely speaking, (X,Y) can infer the sky’s color by always
setting itself up so that it (correctly) answers that the sky does
not have a given color c, so long as it can do that for any given
color c.17 So to say that (X,Y) knows Γ = γ over (all u in) W,
it makes sense not just to require that (X,Y) > Γ, but also that
for all γ ∈ Γ(U), there exists some u ∈ W such that both X(u)
is a setup value that arises for the question, “Does Γ(u) = γ?”,
and that Y(u) = 1, i.e., that the device answers ‘yes’.
Similarly, it would be problematic to say that the device
(X,Y) “knows” the sky’s color if (X,Y) can infer the sky’s
color by always setting itself up so that it (correctly) answers
that the sky does have a given color c, so long as it can do that
for any given color c. This suggests we want to also add the
requirement that for all γ ∈ Γ(U), there exists some u ∈ W
such that X(u) is a setup value that arises for the question,
“Does Γ(u) , γ?”, and that Y(u) = −1, i.e., that the device
answers ‘no’.
To model knowledge in this sense, not just inference, we
need to guarantee that there is some color c such that when-
16Note that there must be some x that allows Y(u) = 1, since |Y(U)| = 2.
However it may be that none of those specific x’s that are involved in the
ID’s inferring Γ have that property.
17This characteristic of weak inference is an example of how flexible and unre-
strictive the definition of weak inference is, mentioned above. This particular
flexibility is most reasonable for the inference process of control, where typi-
cally x directly influences the value of Γ, and to a somewhat lesser degree for
the inference process of observation.
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ever the history u is in some set W, for the question, “Is the
sky’s color c?”, the inference device will answer ‘yes’, and
be correct. In other words, you don’t “know” the sky’s color
whenever u ∈ W if you can only ever say what color it is not
whenever u ∈ W. For it to be the case that whenever u ∈ W
you know that the sky’s color is c, at a minimum, it must be
that you can correctly answer “yes, the sky’s color is c”, for
some such u ∈ W. Nonetheless, we also want to guarantee
that there is at least one u ∈ W at which we correctly answer
“no, c′ is not the sky’s color” for some color c′, which may be
the same as c or different.
Formal definition of physical knowledge
We can formalize this strengthened version of inference as
follows:
Definition 11. Consider an inference device (X,Y) defined
over U, a function Γ defined over U, a γ ∈ Γ(U), and a subset
W ⊆ U. We say that “(X,Y) (physically) knows Γ = γ over
W” iff ∃ ξ : Γ(U)→ X such that
i) ∀γ′ ∈ Γ(U), u ∈ ξ(γ′)⇒ δγ′ (Γ(u)) = Y(u),
ii) ∅ , ξ(γ) ∩W ⊆ Y−1(1).
iii) For all γ′ , γ, ∅ , ξ(γ′) ∩W ⊆ Y−1(−1);
(Recall that X is the partition of U induced by X.) When I
want to specify the precise function ξ used in Def. 11, I will
say that “by using ξ, (X,Y) knows that Γ = γ over W”.
By Def. 11(i), if (X,Y) physically knows Γ = γ over W,
then (X,Y) weakly infers Γ. So (X,Y) is always correct in its
inference — even if u < W. We impose this requirement for all
of U, not just W, because the agent using the device does not
have any a priori reason to expect that u ∈ W. So it does them
no good to be able to set up a device that will correctly say
whether some function has a certain value — but only if the
condition u ∈ W ⊂ U holds, a condition they cannot detect.
Def. 11(ii) and Def. 11(iii) are the extra conditions be-
yond just weak inference, forcing the ID to answer ’yes’ at
least once, and to answer ’no’ at least once. Neither of those
conditions depend on the precise form of the function Γ(u),
only its image, Γ(U) (which specifies the domain of ξ). It’s
also worth noting that most of the analysis below does not
invoke Def. 11(iii). The motivation for including that con-
dition anyway will arise below, when we demonstrate that
physical knowledge need not imply logical omniscience; this
demonstration is more consequential if it applies even when
Def. 11(iii) holds.
The following properties are immediate:
Lemma 17. Let (X,Y) be a device defined over U, Γ a func-
tion over U, and W a subset of U. Say that by using ξ, (X,Y)
knows that Γ = γ over W. It follows that:
i) Γ(u) = γ ∀u ∈ ξ(γ) ∩W;
ii) If W refines Γ, then Γ(W) = γ.
Proof. To prove the first claim, note from Def. 11(ii) that for
all u ∈ ξ(γ) ∩W, Y(u) = 1. By Def. 11(i), this means that at
all such u, Γ(u) = γ, completing the proof. Given this, if in
addition W refines Γ (so that Γ(u) has the same value across
all W), then it must be that Γ(u) = γ for all u ∈ W. (Similar
arguments for Y(u) = −1 follow by using Def. 11(iii).) This
establishes the second claim. 
Note that the definition of physical knowledge does not re-
quire that ξ(γ) ⊆ Y−1(1), but only that ξ(γ) ∩ W ⊆ Y−1(1)
(and similarly for Y−1(−1)). The simple fact that x¯ ∈ ξ(γ)
and nothing more does not imply that the device must answer
‘yes’ if X(u) = ξ(γ). Furthermore, there may be more than
one ξ(.) with which the ID can “know Γ = γ over W”. There
may even be some other ξ(.) that can be used to instead know
Γ = γ′ , γ over W. This illustrates that physical knowl-
edge does not require that Γ have the same value over all of
ξ(Γ). This flexibility means that physical knowledge includes
knowledge that occurs by observation of the value of Γ, just
like inference does.
A related point is that we do not require that W refine Γ to
have a device know that Γ = γ. This freedom allows the de-
vice to know that Γ = γ over W even if the value of Γ depends
on the value of X, the question the device is asking. In other
words, it is possible that the device both knows that Γ = γ
over W and knows that Γ = γ′ over W for some γ′ , γ. In
this sense, the definition of physical knowledge is extremely
non-restrictive.
This lack of restriction means that physical knowledge al-
lows for “quantum-mechanical-style” coupling of an observa-
tion device and the system being observed. More generally,
it allows (X,Y) to be a device that controls the property Γ of
the system being observed. Typically though, when we are
interested in knowledge in the sense of accurate prediction or
observation that does not affect the system being predicted /
observed, W will refine Γ.
The following example illustrates Def. 11 in more detail:
Example 8. Say that the sky above Greenwich, UK at time t is
{blue, cloud-free, with the sun less than 15 degrees above the
horizon}. Furthermore, say that at some time t′, Bob knows
that the sky above Greenwich, UK at time t is blue. (It does
not matter whether t′ = t.) To formalize this knowledge in
terms of Def. 11, let U be the set of all histories in which
both Bob and Greenwich, UK exist, and where in addition the
following conditions hold:
i) There is a partition C of all possible distributions of the
intensity of light in optical wavelengths. For example, one
element of that partition is ‘green’, one is ‘red’, and one
is the color ’blue’;
ii) Bob asks himself at t′, “Is c the color of the sky above
Greenwich at t?”, for some color c ∈ C;
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iii) Bob answers that question at that time t′ to the best of his
abilities, with either a ’yes’ or a ’no’.
Define Γ(u) as the map taking each u ∈ U to the associated
element of C that characterizes the color of the sky above
Greenwich at t. Define X(u) as the map taking each u ∈ U
to the associated color c where at t′ Bob is asking himself the
question, “Does the sky’s color at Greenwich at t equal c?”.
Assume that the image of X is all C. Next, let Y(u) specify the
binary answer in Bob’s mind at t′. Finally, let W ⊆ U be the
set of all histories u such that the sky above Greenwich at time
t is {blue, cloud-free, with the sun less than 15 degrees above
the horizon}, and assume u ∈ W.
Given all this, “at t′, Bob knows the sky is blue above
Greenwich at time t, when the sky above Greenwich at time
t is {blue, cloud-free, with the sun less than 15 degrees above
the horizon}”, in the sense of Def. 11 if three conditions are
met:
i) There is a u for which “the sky above Greenwich at time
t is {blue, cloud-free, with the sun less than 15 degrees
above the horizon}” and for which X(u) specifies the
question, “Is the sky blue above Greenwich at t?”, i.e.
for which Bob is asking himself that question at t′;
ii) For the u in (i), Y(u) specifies that Bob answers ’yes’ at
t′;
iii) If the sky above Greenwich at time t were still {blue,
cloud-free, with the sun less than 15 degrees above the
horizon}, but instead Bob were able to ask himself at t′
any question of the form “Does the sky’s color at Green-
wich at t equal c′?” where c′ , blue (i.e., if the history
were some different u′ ∈ W where X(u′) , X(u)) and did
so, Bob would answer ’no’ at t′ (i.e., Y(u) would equal
−1).
This is a very simple example. In particular, in some situ-
ations for Bob to know at t′ that the sky is blue at Greenwich
at t, Bob will need to configure an apparatus to have a partic-
ular state at a particular time (e.g., he may need to configure
an automatic camera to photograph the sky above Greenwich
at t). In such situations, X not only specifies the question that
Bob asks himself at t′ but also specifies how Bob configures
the apparatus. See [39].
Note that the set U in this example might be a proper sub-
set of the set of all histories that are consistent with the laws
of physics. This is just an example of the fact that the defini-
tion of weak inference in general implicitly specifies a set U
that is a subset of the set of all physically possible histories.
Indeed, there might very well be histories that are consistent
with the laws of physics in which Bob does not exist, or per-
haps even Greenwich does not exist. Clearly we cannot speak
of whether Bob does or does not “know the sky is blue” in any
such histories.18
18This need to restrict the universe of discourse to a subset of all physically
Finally, note that Bob could conceivably also know at time
t that the sky above Greenwich, UK at time t is cloud-free, or
that the sun in that sky is less than 15 degrees above the hori-
zon. Any such alternative knowledge would require posing a
question to Bob about a different subject. Therefore it would
require a different value of X(u), and therefore a different u.
However W, the state of the sky above Greenwich at t, doesn’t
vary with the question that Bob asks concerning that sky. This
means that W contains each of those different u’s that result
in different values of X(u). Ultimately, it is to allow this pos-
sibility of multiple questions all concerning the same state of
the sky that the definition of physical knowledge involves sets
W.
Epistemic logic based on physical knowledge
Inference knowledge obeys many of the usual properties
considered in theories of logic. Here I illustrate this by pre-
senting some of those properties.
For the rest of this subsection assume that any space U we
consider is countable. I will consider Boolean-valued func-
tions, i.e., functions Γ such that Γ(U) = {−1, 1}. It will also
be convenient to identify each such binary-valued function Γ
over U with the associated set Γ−1(1). Using this identifica-
tion, any so-called concrete Boolean algebra over subsets of
U defines a Boolean algebra over an associated set of binary-
valued functions, which we call the function Boolean alge-
bra. (Equivalently, a function Boolean algebra over U is a
Boolean algebra specified by a set of bit strings indexed by
elements of U.)
Moreover, we can always express an arbitrary Boolean al-
gebra as a concrete Boolean algebra [2]. Accordingly, given
any Boolean algebra with propositions Φ, we can identify any
specific proposition φ ∈ Φ as a subset of U in the concrete
Boolean algebra, and then identify that element of the con-
crete Boolean algebra with an element of the function Boolean
algebra. So we can identify any proposition φ with a specific
binary function, which we write as Γφ (with the set Φ usually
implicit).
We now use the function Boolean algebra to define the stan-
dard shorthands of propositional logic for binary-valued func-
tions. For example, for any two binary-valued functions Γ1
and Γ2, their logical AND is
Γ1(u) ∧ Γ2(u) = {u ∈ U : Γ1(u) = Γ2(u) = 1} (5)
and the logical NOT is given by
¬Γ1(u) = {u ∈ U : Γ1(u) = −1} (6)
This allows us to apply the usual axioms of Boolean alge-
bra to binary-valued functions. We can also adopt the usual
possible histories holds no matter how we formalize “knowledge”. It has
nothing to do with formalizing knowledge using inference devices.
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abbreviations from Boolean algebra, e.g.,
Γ1 ∨ Γ2 = ¬(¬Γ1 ∧ ¬Γ2); (7)
Γ1 ≡ Γ2 = (Γ1 ∧ Γ2) ∨ (¬Γ1 ∧ ¬Γ2); (8)
Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 = ¬Γ1 ∨ Γ2; (9)
Γ1 ⇔ Γ2 = (Γ1 ⇒ Γ2) ∧ (Γ2 ⇒ Γ1) (10)
I extend this terminology to cases where we are considering
subsets W ⊆ U in the obvious way, e.g., Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 has the
value ‘true’ over W iff ¬Γ1(u) ∨ Γ2(u) has the value ‘true’ for
all u ∈ W.
Similarly, though it is not used in this paper, as is conven-
tional we can take the function TRUE(u) to be an abbreviation
for some fixed propositional tautology such as (Γ1 ∨ ¬Γ1)(u)
(i.e., the function that equals 1 for all u ∈ U) and FALSE to be
an abbreviation for the function ¬ TRUE.19 In keeping with
this, I will sometimes use the term ’true’ to mean the value 1,
and use the term ‘false’ to mean the value −1.
In many conventional types of epistemic logic, in particu-
lar Kripke structures, knowledge is defined in such a way that
is impossible for an agent to know two contradictory things.
However as discussed above, to allow physical knowledge to
capture the case where the agent “knows a function has a spe-
cific value” due to the (physical) fact that they control the
value of that function, we are careful to define terms so that an
agent can physically know contradictory things. Specifically,
this occurs if the function that they physically know, Γ, takes
on more than one value across the set under consideration, W,
and by appropriate choice of (ξ and therefore) x¯, the agent can
cause different probes of Γ(u) to have the value 1. (Note that
in this case Γ is not refined by W.)
Because of this, certain epistemic properties that are au-
tomatically satisfied in conventional types of epistemic logic
must be carefully derived in analysis of physical knowledge.
The following proposition presents one of these properties.
For pedagogical clarity, in the remainder of this subsection,
“is true” is shorthand for “is true over W” and similarly “is
false” is shorthand for “is false over W”.
Proposition 18. Let Γ be any binary-valued function over U,
D = (X,Y) any device over U, and W some (implicit) subset
of U. ThenD knows that Γ is false iffD knows that ¬Γ is true.
Proof. I prove the forward direction; the inverse follows the
same way. Let ξΓ be the operator establishing that “D knows
that Γ is false”. So ξΓ(−1) ∩ W ⊆ Y−1(1). Define ξ¬Γ(γ) =
ξΓ(−γ) for all γ ∈ B (i.e., for all γ in the codomains of both Γ
and ¬Γ). It follows that ξ¬Γ(1)∩W ⊆ Y−1(1). This establishes
that if the condition Def. 11(ii) hold for “D knows that Γ is
19 Note that these two function each violate the requirement of the usual for-
mulation of inference devices that every function take on at least two values.
So in particular, in order to consider whether a device can weakly infer such
a function, we would need to weaken the definition of weak inference of a
function to allow a single value in the image of that function.
false (over W)”, then it must also hold for “D knows that ¬Γ
is true”. Property (iii) is established using an analogous argu-
ment. Finally if property (i) in Def. 11 holds for “D knows
that Γ is false” using ξΓ, it must also hold for “D knows that
¬Γ is true” using ξ¬Γ. This establishes the (forward direction
of the) claim in full.

Note that applying Prop. 18(i) with a new function Γ′ := −Γ
establishes that a deviceD knows that a function Γ′ is true iff
D knows that ¬Γ′ is false.
In contrast to these results, if the function under considera-
tion is refined by W, then the agent cannot know contradictory
things concerning the value of that function. We start our dis-
cussion of this kind of situation with an immediate corollary
of Lemma 17(ii), which intuitively says that a device cannot
physically know something if that thing is false:
Corollary 19. Suppose that W refines Γ. Then if D knows
that Γ is true (over W), Γ is true.
(Similarly, if W refines Γ and D knows that Γ is false, Γ is
false.) Note that Coroll. 19 tells us that if W refines Γ, then it
is possible thatD knows that Γ is true, or thatD knows that Γ
is false — but not both. So if W refines Γ, we have the usual
property thatD cannot know two contradictory things.
Since binary-valued functions obey the rules of proposi-
tional logic, Coroll. 19 means that if W refines Γ as well as Γ′,
and D both knows that Γ is true and that Γ′ is true, it follows
that Γ ∧ Γ′ is true. This immediately establishes many prop-
erties of physical knowledge — in particular if Γ′ involves the
logical⇒ operator defined in Eq. (9) — including the follow-
ing:
Corollary 20. Let Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3 be any binary-valued func-
tions over U, andD = (X,Y) any device over U.
i) Say that W refines Γ1. Then if D knows that Γ1 is true,
and Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true, it follows that Γ2 is true.
ii) Say that W refines Γ1 as well as Γ1 ⇒ Γ2. Then if D
knows that Γ1 is true, and knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true, it
follows that Γ2 is true.
iii) Say that W refines Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 as well as Γ2 ⇒ Γ3. Then ifD
both knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true and knows that Γ2 ⇒ Γ3
is true, it follows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ3 is true.
iv) Say that we have a set of binary-valued functions {Γi : i =
1, . . .N} and that W refines Γ1 as well as Γi ⇒ Γi+1 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1}. Then ifD knows that Γ1 is true and
knows that Γi ⇒ Γi+1 is true for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1}, it
follows that Γi is true for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}.
(In interpreting these results, the reader should remember to
insert “over W” after every statement about whether a function
is true or false.)
In general, the properties described in Coroll. 20 do not
hold without the conditions that certain functions are refined
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by W. So for the most part, they need not hold for the case
where an agent knows the value of a function because they
control its value. Note though that Coroll. 20(ii) does not re-
quire that W refine Γ2. Similarly Coroll. 20(iii) does not re-
quire that W refine either Γ1, Γ2, Γ3, or Γ1 ⇒ Γ3.
We can weaken the last two claims in Coroll. 20:
Corollary 21. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be any binary-valued functions
over U, D any device over U, and W any (implicit) subset of
U.
i) Say that W refines Γ1 and refines Γ1 ⇒ Γ2. Then if either
D knows that Γ1 is true and Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true, or Γ1 is true
and D knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true, it follows that Γ2 is
true.
ii) Say that W refines Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 and refines Γ2 ⇒ Γ3. Then if
either D both knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true and Γ2 ⇒ Γ3
is true, or Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true and D knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ3 is
true it follows that Γ2 ⇒ Γ3 is true.
Impossibility results concerning physical knowledge
There are major restrictions on physical knowledge. The
first such restriction follows from the first demon theorem.
Corollary 22. For any deviceD, there exists a function Γ over
U such that for no W ⊆ U, γ ∈ Γ(U) doesD know Γ = γ over
W.
The second major restriction follows from the second de-
mon theorem.
Corollary 23. Let (X1,Y1) and (X−1,Y−1) be two distinguish-
able devices. Then for at least one of the two devices i ∈
{−1, 1}, there is no pair (W ⊆ U, y−i ∈ Y−i(U)) such that
(Xi,Yi) knows that Y−i = y−i over W.
Similarly, Coroll. 3 provides another restriction on physical
knowledge:
Corollary 24. Consider a pair of devices D = (X,Y) and
D′ = (X′,Y ′) that are both distinguishable from one another
and whose conclusion functions are inequivalent. Say that
there is a W ⊆ U that refines Y such that D′ knows that
Y = Y(W) over W. Then there are at least three inequiv-
alent surjective binary functions Γ such that there is no W ′
with the following two properties: W′ refines Γ, and D know
that Γ = Γ(W ′) when W ′.
In other words, if D′ knows the value of D’s conclusion
function over W, then there are at least three separate func-
tions that D never knows, no matter what the subset of U we
are in.
Physical knowledge and the first three rules of S5
S5 is a set of five rules obeyed by many epistemic logics,
including Kripke structures. The “knowledge axiom” of S5
says that if an agent knows a Boolean proposition φ, then φ
must be true. We can use the map from propositions to binary
functions (discussed just before Eq. (5)) to formulate a physi-
cal knowledge version of this axiom. Coroll. 19 confirms that
the physical knowledge analog of the knowledge axiom holds
(assuming we only consider sets W that refine Γφ).
In addition to the knowledge axiom, S5 also includes the
“knowledge generalization rule”, which says that if proposi-
tion φ is true in all possible states of the world (i.e., if φ is
necessarily true rather than contingently true), then the agent
knows φ. An analogous rule in terms of physical knowledge
might be that if W refines Γ1, and Γ1 is true over W, then the
agent physically knows Γ1 is true over W. However this rule
need not hold; an agent (X,Y) may not be able to weakly infer
Γ1, whether or not Γ1 is true over W. (And even if they can
infer Γ1, it may be that Y−1(1) ∩W = ∅.)
The “distribution axiom” of S5 says that if an agent both
knows proposition φ1 and knows φ1 ⇒ φ2, then φ2 is true and
they know this. In contrast, Coroll. 20(ii) only establishes that
if an agent both physically knows that Γ1 is true over W and
knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 is true over W, then Γ2 is also true over
W. However it is easy to construct examples where the condi-
tions for Coroll. 20(ii) hold but the agent does not know Γ2 is
true. Ultimately, the reason for this difference between physi-
cal knowledge and Kripke structures is due to the requirement
of physical knowledge of Γ that the device weakly infer Γ —
a requirement that involves considering counterfactual scenar-
ios, something not done in conventional epistemic logics.
For what are ultimately the same reasons, the conditions
for Coroll. 20(i) may hold even if the agent does not physi-
cally know that Γ2 is true. This is illustrated in the following
example:
Example 9. For purposes of this example, fix some particu-
lar location and time. Suppose that the (binary-valued) func-
tion Γ1(u) is defined by whether the temperature in u is / isn’t
ten degrees celsius at that location and time. Have Γ2(u) be
whether the temperature in u is / isn’t above freezing. Presume
U is large enough that there are u ∈ U that satisfy each of the
three possible values of (Γ1(u),Γ2(u)). Finally, have W be the
set of all u at which the temperature is ten degrees. Note that
(Γ1 ⇒ Γ2)(u) is always true. (This means it is a “valid” state-
ment, in the language of epistemic logic.) So in particular it
is true for all u ∈ W.
To ground thinking suppose that the ID is a thermometer
that outputs a 1 or -1, depending on the temperature. x is
the value of the temperature that the thermometer is checking.
By Def. 11(i), if the agent physically knows Γ1 = 1 over W,
then there is some setup function ξ they can use to configure
their thermometer to correctly give a 1 if the temperature is
ten degrees, and to correctly give a -1 otherwise. In other
words, such physical knowledge requires that when answering
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the question, “Is the temperature ten degrees?” (i.e., does
Γ1(u) = 1), the agent will set X to be in the state ξ(1), and
they will be guaranteed that the associated conclusion Y(u)
will equal δ1(u) for any u ∈ ξ(1) whether or not u ∈ W.
In general, depending on whether that ξ obeys ξ(1) ⊆ W,
this phenomenon may mean that the ID gives the correct an-
swer for some u in which the temperature is not ten degrees.
This is key: the ID is set up with the same x value regardless of
whether u ∈ W. After the thermometer is set up this way, then
the agent learns whether the temperature equals ten degrees.
If (after having been set up with the x value corresponding
to ten degrees) the ID tells the agent that the temperature is
indeed ten degrees (since u ∈ W), at that point the agent has
physical knowledge that the temperature is ten degrees. But
not before.
In particular, consider the situation where ξ(1) is big
enough to contain both a u where the temperature is five de-
grees, and one where it is negative five degrees (in addition to
containing one where it is ten degrees). Since we require that
Y(u) = δ1(Γ1(u)) for all u ∈ ξ(1), this means that Y(u) = −1
for both of those u’s. Note though that Γ2(u) has different
values for those two temperatures. This means that the agent
cannot use this same ξ that allows them to weakly infer Γ1
to also weakly infer Γ2. (This is how the intuitive notion of
regular implication would work too; if all I know is that the
temperature is not 10 degrees, then I don’t know whether it
is -5 or 5.) Moreover, in general, there may not be any alter-
native to this ξ that the agent can use with that thermometer
to weakly infer Γ2, i.e., weakly infer whether the temperature
is above freezing or not. In this situation, the agent cannot
weakly infer Γ2. (Recall again the key point that in the defi-
nition of physical knowledge we require that weak inference
holds for all u ∈ U, not just the u ∈ W.)
So in this situation, the agent does not physically know that
Γ2 = 1 for u ∈ W. Loosely speaking, there are thermome-
ters that can be used to always tell us correctly whether the
temperature is (not) ten degrees – both when it is and when
it isn’t ten degrees. However some such thermometers cannot
be used to always tell us correctly whether the temperature is
(not) above freezing (both when it is and when it isn’t above
freezing).
Given such a thermometer, for the particular situation
where the thermometer is set up to detect whether the tem-
perature is ten degrees, and in addition it answers ’yes’, you
and I can use our reasoning ability to realize that the tem-
perature must above above zero. But the ability to use such
reasoning to come to a conclusion is not the same thing as
physical knowledge of that conclusion.
In the rest of this example I establish this argument in a fully
formal manner, making the simplifying assumption that W re-
fines Γ1, as in Coroll. 20(i). First, note that by Lemma 17(ii),
since the ID physically know that Γ1 = 1 when W, Γ1(u) is true
throughout W. This in turn means that Γ2 is true throughout
W (since Γ1 ⇒ Γ2).
Let ξ be the function that establishes that condition
Def. 11(ii) holds for Γ1. We can use that same function to
establish that condition Def. 11(ii) holds for Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 and
for Γ2. Similar arguments hold for condition Def. 11(iii). So
D meets conditions (ii) and (iii) for having physical knowl-
edge of both Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 and Γ2. So to complete our analysis
of whether D has physical knowledge that Γ2 = 1, we must
consider whether condition Def. 11(i) for Γ2. We do this by
considering two cases, one in which D does physically know
Γ2 = 1 when W, and one where it does not:
1. First, assume ξ(γ) ⊆ W both for γ = 1 and γ = −1.
Since Def. 11(i) holds for Γ1 for that ξ, and since
Γ1(u) = Γ2(u) throughout W, it is immediate that
Def. 11(i) also holds for that ξ. So D knows that Γ2
is true over W, under our assumption.
Next, plug the fact that Γ1(u) = Γ2(u) = 1 for all
u ∈ W into the definition of Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 to see that
δ1((Γ1 ⇒ Γ2)(u)) = 1 for all u ∈ ξ(1) ⊂ W. So
δ1((Γ1 ⇒ Γ2)(u)) = Y(u) for all u ∈ ξ(1). This estab-
lishes that Def. 11(i) holds for the function Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 for
the case of γ′ = 1. For the remaining case of γ′ = −1,
note that for all u ∈ ξ(−1), again Γ1(u) = Γ2(u) = 1. So
δ−1((Γ1 ⇒ Γ2)(u)) = −1. Since Y(u) = −1 throughout
ξ(−1), this establishes that Def. 11(i) also holds for the
function Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 for the case of γ′ = −1. Accordingly,
under our assumption that the support of both ξ(1) and
of ξ(−1) is restricted to W,D knows that Γ1 ⇒ Γ2 over
W.
2. In many situations however, even though W refines Γ1,
it will not be the case that the associated function ξ that
establishes that Def. 11(i) and Def. 11(ii) both hold for
Γ1 always produce sets that are confined to W. Very
often either ξ(1) * W and / or ξ(−1) * W. An example
of this is given just above, in the discussion involving
thermometers. As mentioned in that discussion, for such
a ξ, it may be that (for example) ξ(1) contains points
u′ < W such that Γ1(u′) = −1 but Γ2(u′) = 1. Now for
any such u′, it must be that Y(u′) = −1 (sinceD weakly
infers Γ1). On the other hand, for any u ∈ W ∩ ξ(1),
Y(u) = 1. Since the value of Γ2(u) does not change
across ξ(1), this means that Y and Γ2 cannot have the
same value across all of ξ(1).
This means that that function ξ could not be used to
establish that D weakly infers Γ2 — and therefore all
bets are off concerning whetherD can physically know
Γ2 over W. This reflects the fact that while under the
conditions of Coroll. 20(i) Γ1 and Γ2 must be identical
for all u ∈ W, they will in general differ outside of W,
and so a device that can say both whether Γ1 is true or
not may not be able to tell us whether Γ2 is true or not.
Recall from the introduction that in many epistemic logics,
if an agent knows a proposition φ is true (more generally, that
a set of propositions are true), and φ ⇒ φ′, then not only is
φ′ true — but the agent knows that it is. (In particular, as
discussed above, this is true of Kripke structures.)
22
This property of “(full) logical omniscience” is a major
problem with these logics, since logical omniscience implies
for example that if someone knows the axioms of numbers
theory, then they know all the theorems of number theory that
are implied by those axioms. However as illustrated in Ex. 9,
physical knowledge need not obey logical omniscience.20
A closely related point is that the definition of physical
knowledge does not fully agree with the colloquial meaning
of the term “knowledge”. It should really be viewed more of
a strengthened form of inference, capturing more of the com-
mon structure of real-world prediction, observation, memory
and control, rather than an attempt to provide an accurate en-
try in an English language dictionary.
For example, it is possible that a device knows that Γ1∧Γ2 =
1 over W, but does not know that Γ1 = 1 over W. In particular,
physical knowledge by a device that Γ1 ∧ Γ2 = 1 over W pro-
vides no guarantees that the device weakly infers Γ1; loosely
speaking, the ID may not be able to correctly answer questions
concerning the value of Γ1(u) for u < W, even though they can
answers concerning the value of Γ1(u) ∧ Γ2(u) for such u.21,22
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the definition of physi-
cal knowledge could be weakened to agree with this aspect of
the colloquial meaning of “knowledge”. One way to do that
would be drop the requirement that the ID infer Γ in full, in-
cluding for u < W. Under this modified definition of what it
means for the ID to know that Γ = γ over W, we would still re-
quire that for all u ∈ ξ(γ), if Y(u) = 1, then Γ(u) = γ (whether
or not u ∈ W). So no matter what u is, we would require that
if the device is answering the question, “does Γ(u) = γ?” and
it answers ‘yes’, then it is correct. However for all γ′ , γ,
we only require that for all u ∈ W ∩ ξ(γ′), if Y(u) = −1, then
δγ(Γ(u)) = Y(u). Under this modification, we would allow
there to be u outside of W, and γ′ , γ, where the device is
answering the question, “does Γ(u) = γ′?” and incorrectly
answers ‘no’.
Physical knowledge that you have physical knoweldge
The final two rules of S5 are known as the positive intro-
spection rule and the negative introspection rule. Intuitively,
they stipulate that when an agent knows something, they know
that they know it, and when they don’t know something, they
know that they don’t know it (resp.).
20It is known that so long as both the distribution axiom and the knowledge
generalization rule hold — which is the case in all so-called “normal modal
logics” — then so does (full) logical omniscience. However neither of those
need hold with physical knowledge.
21As an example, suppose that some of the subsets x¯ that are images of ξ extend
beyond W, and in particular include points u at which Γ1(u) ∧ Γ2(u) = −1
while Γ1(u) = 1. Y(u) must equal -1 for such a u, since the device uses ξ to
weakly infer Γ1 ∧ Γ2. But this means that ξ does not weakly infer Γ1, and so
does not know Γ1 = 1 over W.
22This should not be surprising; if logical omniscience held, then knowledge
that Γ1 ∧ Γ2 = 1 over W would imply knowledge that Γ1 = 1 over W.
Perhaps the simplest formalization of these rules occurs in
the event-based framework based on Aumann structures [5–
7, 10, 16, 18, 42]. As discussed in the introduction, in this
framework, in this framework events are defined as subsets of
U. We say “Alice knows event E” if A(u) ⊆ E, where A is
Alice’s knowledge operator. So the event, “Alice knows E” is
just the union of all u such that Alice knows E for U = u, i.e.,
the union of all u ∈ U such that A(u) ⊆ E . (Note that even
if u ∈ E, A(u) may include points u′ < E — no elements of
such a set A(u) are contained in the event “Alice knows E”.)
It is immediate that if Alice knows event E, then Alice knows
{Alice knows E}. This is the (event-based approach version of
the) positive introspection rule.
Physical knowledge is formulated in terms of functions and
subsets W, not in terms of events, so we need to extend it to
consider the introspection rules. We say that “D (physically)
knows event E ⊆ U” if D knows XE = 1 over E for some
ξ. Next, we must define what subset of U is represented by
“the event that {D knows event E}”, i.e., by “the event that {D
knows XE = 1 over E for some ξ}”. We adopt the interpreta-
tion that this set is the union of all sets x¯ that might arise in
the image of some ξ such that D knows XE = 1 over E for ξ.
We write this set as
K(D knows E) :=
⋃
ξ : D knows XE =1 over E f or ξ
ξ(1) ∪ ξ(−1)
(11)
(Note that in general, K(D knows E) can include points u that
lie outside of E.) This allows us to translate from the event-
based framework to the physical knowledge framework: we
say that “D obeys positive introspection” if for every event
thatD knows,D also knows the event K(D knows E).
Corollary 25. For every event that a deviceD knows,D also
knows the event K(D knows E)
Proof. Plugging in, “D knows the event K(D knows E)” will
be established if we can show that
D knows XK(D knows E) = 1 over K(D knows E)
for some ξ.
Now by hypothesis D knows event E. So there is at least
one function ξ such that D knows XE = 1 over E for ξ. By
Def. 11(i), this means thatDweakly infersXE using ξ. There-
fore for both γ ∈ B, u ∈ ξ(γ) ⇒ δγ(XE(u)) = Y(u). Moreover
for both γ ∈ B, XE(u) = XK(D knows E)(u) for all u ∈ ξ(γ).
Therefore D weakly infers XK(D knows E) using that same func-
tion ξ.
Next, note that ξ(1)∩K(D knows E) equals ξ(1)∩E. More-
over, sinceD knows XE = 1 over E for ξ, by Def. 11(ii), ∅ ,
ξ(1)∩E ⊆ Y−1(1). So∅ , ξ(1)∩K(D knows E) ⊆ Y−1(1).
Therefore the condition in Def. 11(ii) holds for knowledge that
XK(D knows E) = 1 over K(D knows E) by using ξ .
Similarly, ∅ , ξ(−1)∩K(D knows E) ⊆ Y−1(−1). So all
three criteria in Def. 11 are met for physical knowledge that
XK(D knows E) = 1 over K(D knows E) by using ξ. 
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In this sense, the positive introspection rule of S5 holds for
physical knowledge.
The negative introspection rule cannot hold for the event-
based framework. This is because the event “Alice does not
know E” cannot contain any u obeying u ∈ A(u), and so Alice
can never know that she does not know E. (As a result, inves-
tigations in the event-based approach focus on negative intro-
spection of belief rather than negative introspection of knowl-
edge.) Not surprisingly then, it is not clear how to formalize a
physical knowledge version of the negative introspection rule,
since that requires defining a function over U that captures the
case that the device does not know that u ∈ E. (N.b., that is
not the same as having the device know that u < E.)
FUTURE WORK
Much more work remains to complete our understanding of
inference. Perhaps most obviously, a lot remains to be inves-
tigated concerning the relationship between structures like in-
ference complexity (the ID version of Kolmogorov complex-
ity) and all the results in algorithmic information theory, from
Chaitin’s “incompleteness theorem” to the Halting theorem to
computational complexity theory.
There is also a lot of future work to be done concerning
physical knowledge. To begin, it might be useful to extend
the analysis of physical knowledge to include all the concepts
introduced in the analysis of inference, e.g., strong inference,
covariance accuracy, and inference complexity. Other future
work on physical knowledge would be to develop Prop.18,
Coroll. 19 and Coroll. 20 into a complete axiomatization of
physical knowledge, i.e., a set of axioms that are logically
equivalent to the definition of physical knowledge. The goal
would be to parallel the kind of axiomatization which has been
done for Kripke structures (See Chap. 3 of [16].) As a final
example, it might be illuminating to construct and then inves-
tigate physical knowledge versions of common knowledge, of
distributed knowledge, and associated results in conventional
epistemic logic, e.g., Aumann’s famous proof that “no two
Bayesians can disagree” [7].
There are also many ways to extend the concept of physi-
cal knowledge to capture attributes of our physical world, like
space and time. As an example, suppose we are given a dis-
tance function D(γ, γ′) : Γ(U) × Γ(U) → R+. We want to
use that D(., .) to define the distance between what a given ID
“says” that Γ(u) is, and what Γ(u) really is. One way to do
this builds on the physical knowledge formalism. For sim-
plicity, assume W refines Γ. We say that D claims γ over W
if ∃ ξ : Γ(U) → X¯ such that for all u ∈ ξ(γ) ∩ W, Y(u) = 1,
and for all γ′ , γ, u ∈ ξ(γ′) ∩W, Y(u) = −1. (Note that there
may be more than one γ thatD claims over W.) We define the
error of D over W (for γ) as the smallest  ∈ R such that D
claims γ over W and D(Γ(W), γ) = .
By supposing a probability distribution over U as well as a
distance function, we can analyze concepts like the expected
error of the claim of a device, the variance of what a device
claims, etc. In particular, it may be possible to use an error
function to extend the analysis that led to Prop. 11, to investi-
gate the possible relationship between inference and Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle. (As part of such an investigation,
it may be helpful to focus on the specific case where U is a
Hilbert space.)
Other future work is to investigate the use of inference de-
vices in general, and physical knowledge in particular, as a
formalization of “semantic information”, a concept that has
been extensively debated by people ranging from the founders
of information theory and cybernetics [34] to philosophers [1,
29] to people working in statistical physics [14, 15, 32, 41].
Finally, despite the relation of physical knowledge with
epistemic logic, physical knowledge is designed only to cap-
ture properties of knowledge concerning physical reality. It
is not designed to capture properties of knowledge concern-
ing mathematical systems, e.g., predicate logic. However it
may be worth investigating its application to such systems.
For example, one could take each “history” in a reality to be
a (perhaps infinite) string over some fixed alphabet. U might
then be defined as the set of all strings that are “true” under
some encoding that translates a string into axioms and asso-
ciated logical implications. Then an inference device would
be a (perhaps fallible) theorem-proving algorithm, embodied
within U itself. The results presented above would then con-
cern the relation among such theorem-proving algorithms.
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